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Abstract
We use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are com-
plements or substitutes. A sequential English auction model determines the estimating
structural equations. When units are complements, one bidder wins all units by pay-
ing a high price for the first unit, thus deterring others from bidding on subsequent
units. When units are substitutes, diﬀerent bidders win the units with positive prob-
ability, paying prices similar in magnitude. We recover individual demand consistent
with this stark pattern of outcomes and confirm it is not collusive, but consistent with
non-cooperative behavior. Demand estimates are biased if one ignores these features.
JEL Codes: D44, C13, L10, L40.
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1 Introduction
There are many instances in the real world where several units of the same or similar goods are
allocated sequentially or periodically using auctions. Examples include timber, procurement
of public goods, electromagnetic spectrum, and treasury bills. The nature of the goods at
auction and the firms bidding determine whether the goods are complements (increasing
marginal returns or IMR) or substitutes (decreasing marginal returns or DMR). In many
cases, IMR arise because firms incur fixed costs to realize the full value of purchased goods.
This is the case of the machinery and workers needed to fell trees or build highways. Firms
might experience DMR due to limited capacity to hire more workers or buy more machinery.
DMR may also arise as a consequence of the downward sloping demand for the firms’ final
products, e.g., once a firm has a valid spectrum for a given county, the value of another
tranche of the spectrum decreases substantially. Firms would face IMR if the first eﬀect
dominates, DMR if the second eﬀect dominates, and hill shaped marginal returns if both
eﬀects are important.
By aﬀecting the valuation of subsequent units, fixed costs and decreasing returns deter-
mine bidder behavior and price dynamics. Price dynamics are central to connect observed
bids to the underlying distributions that characterize individual demand, which is fundamen-
tal to discuss positive and normative questions. For instance, variation in prices caused by
a high sunk cost will aﬀect even relatively simple tasks such as measuring the dispersion in
individuals’ private valuations. Moreover, in such a case, a competitive environment could
be incorrectly interpreted as collusive.
The existing literature on sequential auctions has provided little empirical evidence on
the eﬀect that complementarities and substitutabilities in the valuation of subsequent units
have on price behavior within the same market. The main reason for this lack of evidence is
the challenge of finding suﬃcient variation in the degree of complementarity within the same
market. Our aim is to address this empirical gap. To that end, we examine a unique panel
data set from sequential water auctions from a self-governed community of farmers in Mula,
Spain.1 Admittedly, few industrial organization economists will find water auctions from
1The four main fruit trees grown in the region are oranges, lemons, peaches, and apricots.
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farmers in southeastern Spain interesting per se. We study this empirical setting because it
allows us to exploit a unique scenario where a market exhibits periodic switches or reversions
between regimes of complementarity and substitutability, i.e., regimes where identical units
may complement and substitute within the same market and for the same bidder. Weather
conditions in Mula generate large changes in the degree of complementarity across seasons:
variation in the importance of sunk costs relative to decreasing returns as described in section
3. We use this variation to: (1) analyze bidding behavior in sequential auctions in which
buyers’ preferences for multiple units exhibit both sunk costs and DMR, and (2) investigate
its implications for price dynamics and price competition. This empirical setting allows to
analyze a stark pattern of outcomes not previously documented in the literature. Sometimes,
winning prices exhibit a standard competitive pattern. In this scenario, winning prices are
similar in magnitude, regardless of whether the same or diﬀerent bidders (farmers in our
case) win the sequential units. Other times, one farmer wins all the units, pays a high price
for the first unit, deters other farmers from entering subsequent auctions, and thus pays a
very low price for the remaining units. We call this the deterrence eﬀect. We show that this
pattern of outcomes is consistent with a non-cooperative equilibrium, where the observed
price dynamics are competitive, not collusive.
The data in this article come from all water auctions in Mula, Spain, from January 1954
through August 1966—when the last auction was run—and the allocation system switched to
a bargaining system, as described in section 2. The data for our analysis consist of individual
winning bids and auction covariates. These covariates include the amount of rainfall. The
basic unit of sale is the right to use three hours of water (432,000 liters) for irrigation. For
each weekday, eight units are sold for each schedule: four for daytime (7AM-7PM) and four
for nighttime (7PM-7AM) irrigation. The auctioneer sells first the twenty units corresponding
to nighttime and then the twenty units corresponding to daytime. This leaves ten four-units
sets of auctions that are sold in order. (The ten sets of four-units auctions are: Monday-
nighttime, Tuesday-nighttime, and so on, until Friday-daytime.) Thus, the relevant unit
of analysis for investigating individuals’ demand and the pattern of outcomes is four-units
auctions. But units within each four-units set are not conditional-independent due to the
presence of sunk costs. Observing the winner’s identity allows us to estimate the model, as
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outlined in section 4. Local weather conditions determine the relevant agricultural irrigation
technology and, hence, water demand. Additionally, as less rain falls in summer than in
winter in southern Spain, the presence of seasonalities provides us with the variation in sunk
costs relative to decreasing returns necessary to perform the empirical investigation.
We incorporate two features from our empirical setting. First, a sunk cost is incurred
for the first unit bought because water flows through a channel dug into the ground. Some
water is lost when the channel is dry (the first unit), but the loss is negligible for subsequent
units. Engineers have estimated that 20% of the water of the first unit that travels through
a dry channel was lost (Gómez-Espín, Gil-Meseguer, and García-Marín 2006). Second, DMR
are present for subsequent units because the amount of irrigated land is fixed. We model the
environment as a sequential ascending price English auction along the lines of von der Fehr
(1994) in which bidders, by incurring a participation cost, decide whether to attend each
sale.
The relative importance of sunk costs and DMR generates a trade-oﬀ, whereby buyers’
bidding behavior depend on whether diﬀerent units are complements or substitutes. When
goods are complements, the same bidder wins all the objects paying a high price for the first
unit equal to the valuation for the whole bundle (four times the second highest valuation for
the first unit, adjusted for the complementarity eﬀect and participation cost). By doing this,
the winner of the first unit deters others from bidding on the remaining three units, allowing
this bidder to pay very low prices (close to zero) for the remaining three units. The resulting
price pattern, along with the same bidder winning all the units, may lead to an incorrect
collusive interpretation. When goods are substitutes, diﬀerent bidders win the objects with a
positive probability and pay prices of similar magnitude, even when the same bidder wins all
the objects. We provide empirical evidence for the key features of our model: participation
and sunk costs.
The price patterns predicted by the model provide a straightforward method to determine
the regime—complements or substitutes—being played. When goods are complements, very
low prices are paid by the same winner (the winner of the first unit) for the second, third,
and fourth units; thus, the diﬀerence between the price paid for the first and the remaining
units is large. When goods are substitutes, the units might be bought by diﬀerent bidders
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and the prices of all four units are similar; thus, the diﬀerence between the price paid for the
first and the remaining units is negligible. This allows to determine the regime by looking at:
(1) the identities of the winner (i.e. whether the same bidder bought all the four units), and
(2) the diﬀerence between the price paid for the first and the remaining units (see section 4).
We estimate the distribution of private valuations by maximum likelihood using an ex-
ponential distribution and the English structure for the auction. To estimate sunk cost and
DMR, we form moment conditions based on the structural equations of the model. We infer
participation costs using data from auctions in which bidders were present, but no one placed
bids. This method gives us bounds on participation costs.
Our empirical work establishes three main results. First, we recover individual de-
mand—characterized by private valuations and the model’s structural parameters—that is
consistent with the described price patterns and the deterrence eﬀect in particular. Second,
the equilibrium price dynamics are consistent with competitive behavior. Non-cooperative
behavior is not only consistent with the deterrence eﬀect, but also predicts such price dif-
ferentials. Incentives to deviate from a collusive strategy are higher in spring and summer,
when water is more valuable. However, it is in spring and summer when we observe non-
cooperative behavior more often. Finally, we show that estimates that ignore the importance
of participation and sunk costs will be biased. We test whether price variations, conditional
on covariates, are better explained by our proposed model or a standard English auction
model without participation costs, using that the latter is encompassed by the former. The
approach of Haile and Tamer (2003), that relies on two basic behavioral assumptions, provides
a robust structural framework for inference. These minimal assumptions are not satisfied in
the present context. We discuss how Haile and Tamer’s structure can be interpreted in the
current setting.
Section 2 discusses the auction system, the empirical regularities, and the modeling as-
sumptions required in our context. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 examines the
estimation procedure. Section 5 presents the results, analyzes the importance of sunk costs,
and the interpretation of complementarities. Section 6 concludes.
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Contributions and Related Literature
We now describe the related literature and highlight how our article contributes to the current
body of work. This article is closest to the empirical literature on sequential auctions with
multi-unit demand. To the best of our knowledge, the price dynamics that we investigate
(see section 2) have not been documented in the literature before. Most of the literature
do not consider participation costs in their analysis. We show how participation costs aﬀect
equilibrium outcomes. We then use our model to partially identify participation costs and
estimate informative bounds.
Numerous empirical studies have highlighted the importance of complementarities (Anton
and Yao 1987; Gandal 1997; Wolfram 1998; Pesendorfer 2000; Marshall, Raiﬀ, Richard, and
Schulenberg 2006).2 Substitutabilities are a major component in several industries such as
sequential highway construction procurement auctions (Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2003),
sequential timber auctions (List, Millimet, and Price 2004), or sequential cattle auctions
(Zulehner 2009). Several authors have studied cases of either complements due to synergies
among auctioned goods, or substitutes due to decreasing marginal utility (Black and De Meza
1992; Branco 1997; Liu 2011). Selling goods in a bundle increases a seller’s revenue when
goods are complements (Palfrey 1983; Levin 1997, Armstrong 2000). Our setting diﬀers from
these scenarios in that we consider sequential, instead of simultaneous, auctions. See Milgrom
(2000) and Ausubel (2004) for recent contributions to this literature. Edelman, Ostrovsky,
and Schwarz (2007) study the properties of a “generalized English auction” used to sell
Internet advertisements and show their proposed mechanism has a unique equilibrium. Kagel
and Levin (2005) experimentally investigate multi-unit demand auctions with synergies, and
compare behavior in sealed-bid and ascending-bid uniform-price auctions. See Kagel (1995)
for a survey on laboratory experimental auction markets.
Prior investigations of the relationship between sequential auctions and the complementar-
ity or substitutability between identical units are more scarce (e.g. Jeitschko and Wolfstetter
2002; Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2012). Jeitschko and Wolfstetter 2002 analyze optimal
sequential auctions in a binary-valuations case. They find that English auctions extract more
2Outside the auction literature, Gentzkow (2007) studies the value of new goods using a model encom-
passing the possibility of both complementarities and substitutabilities.
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rent than first-price auctions. Our model diﬀers as we consider the class of continuous valua-
tion distributions. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2012) allow for complementarities and sub-
stitutabilities in a model of sequential auctions. They find that although first-price auctions
give greater revenue than second-price (English) auctions when the goods are substitutes,
the opposite is true for complements. Both mechanisms are eﬃcient in their model. Their
predictions about price trends are consistent with previous findings. Contrary to our analysis
with participation costs, where buyers are better informed than the seller, Jofre-Bonet and
Pesendorfer (2012) examine the eﬀect of capacity constraints on bidding behavior in pro-
curement auctions using a two-period auction game where sellers have private information
about their costs. Balat (2013) and Groeger (2014) analyze dynamic auctions in the high-
way procurement market. Balat (2013) extends the model from Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer
(2012) by allowing endogenous participation and unobserved heterogeneity. Groeger (2014)
analyzes bidder learning in the entry stage of an auction game. In contrast, we investigate
a stark price dynamics not documented before (see section 2). In our empirical setting, the
same identical units sometimes complement and other times substitute for the same bidder.
We show that these price dynamics are not collusive, but consistent with non-cooperative
behavior. In addition, we infer participation based on two simple assumptions that provide
us informative bounds. Finally, Hendricks and Porter (1988) conducted an early and influ-
ential investigation on how interdependencies among auctioned objects aﬀect the auction’s
outcome. They analyze auctions for drainage leases and show that better informed firms
(which hold tracts neighboring the drainage tracts that were auctioned) earned higher rents
than uninformed ones.
This article makes a methodological contribution by developing an empirical model of
sequential English auctions with participation costs that allows units to complement and
substitute for the same bidder depending on seasonalities. The model produces distinguish-
able price pattern predictions in each regime. This feature allows us to determine the regime
under which the game is being played using the ratio between prices in diﬀerent auctions.
This allows us to weaken the behavioral assumptions, such as the specification of bidders’
beliefs, that would be necessary to solve the whole game (see section 3). Similar to the work
of Hendricks and Porter (1988) and Haile (2001), we show evidence inconsistent with the
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equilibrium predictions of standard models and supportive of a model that captures sunk
costs, decreasing marginal returns, and participation costs. Not accounting for these features
may lead to the incorrect interpretation of a competitive market as collusive.
We build upon the existing literature on participation costs and entry fees (McAfee and
McMillan 1987; Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1993; von der Fehr 1994) by constructing a sequential
English auction model similar to that of von der Fehr (1994). However, our set-up diﬀers
in that bidders are allowed to buy more than one unit of the good. von der Fehr (1994)
considers the case when goods are independent and finds the same equilibrium as that of our
complementarities case.
Although the auction literature has studied price dynamics and the relationship between
sequentially auctioned goods (e.g. Weber 1983; McAfee and Vincent 1993; Benhardt and
Scoones 1994; Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1994), to the best of our knowledge, we analyze a stark
pattern of outcomes not investigated in the literature before. Sometimes, when goods are
substitutes, winning prices exhibit a standard competitive pattern: regardless of whether the
same or diﬀerent bidders win the sequential units, winning prices are similar in magnitude.
Other times, when goods are complements, the same bidder wins all units by paying a high
price for the first unit, deterring others from bidding on subsequent units.3 We show that
this pattern of outcomes is consistent with a competitive market structure. We are not aware
of any study where identical units may complement and substitute within the same market
and for the same bidder. The literature in multi-unit auctions can be divided into sequential
auctions, in which the auctioneer sells the units following a series of sequential steps using
a single-unit auction each time, and simultaneous auctions, in which the auctioneer uses a
complex mechanism to allocate all units simultaneously. For recent contributions see Kastl
(2011), who investigates bidders submitting step functions as their bids in multi-unit treasury
bills auctions, and Reguant (2013), who studies complementarity bidding mechanisms used
in wholesale electricity auctions. Implementing a simultaneous auction requires a strong
commitment from the auctioneer either to not renege in the promised mechanism, or to use the
information elicited in the process to demand a higher price for the good. This also imposes
3Declining or downward price trends in sequential auctions, the results we describe in section 2, have been
broadly documented (e.g. Ashenfelter 1989; Ashenfelter and Genesove 1992; McAfee and Vincent 1993).
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technical diﬃculties in the way bidders frame their contingent bids (Cramton, Shoham, and
Steinberg 2006). Neither of these conditions are satisfied in our setting. Hortaçsu (2011)
discusses recent progress in the empirical study of multi-units auctions. See Kagel and Levin
(2001) for an experimental investigation when bidders demand multiple units in sealed bid
and ascending auctions. In addition to recovering the structural parameters that characterize
individual demand and confirming it is consistent with non-cooperative behavior, which are
of interest to the literature on empirical auctions, we collect a unique panel data set to
examine a market institution that was active and stable for eight centuries in a self-governed
community of farmers in southern Spain.4 Understanding this strategic non-cooperative
behavior of bidders in this stable market institution is of independent interest.
2 Background and Data
The data in this article come from all water auctions in Mula, Spain, from January 1954
through August 1966, when the last auction was run.5 On August 1st, 1966, the allocation
system was modified from an auction to a two-sided bargaining system. In the bargain-
ing system, the Heredamiento de Aguas (water-owners holding) and Sindicato de Regantes
(land-owners association) arranged a fixed price for every cuarta of water (the smallest unit
auctioned). Gradually, the Sindicato de Regantes bought shares in the Heredamiento de
Aguas association until they finally merged in 1974. Thereafter, water was allocated to each
farmer following a fixed quota with each piece of land entitled to some proportion of the
water every year.6
The reasons for focusing on the period from 1954 to 1966 are, first, that it represents the
final period of the auction allocating system in use for at least eight centuries in this region.
Second, the government conducted a special agricultural census in 1954/55, providing detailed
information about the farmers who bid in this period’s auctions
4In the lead article of the first issue of the American Economic Review, Coman (1911) provides an early
discussion of the same institution that is analyzed in detail in this article. For an extensive study of self-
governed irrigation communities see Ostrom (1992).
5Data available in the historical archive of Mula go back to 1803.
6Donna and Espin-Sanchez (2016) shows that this institutional change—from auctions to quotas—was
welfare improving in Mula.
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The study of these sequential auctions introduces a unique circumstance for analyzing a
stark pattern of outcomes not previously documented in the literature. Sometimes, winning
prices exhibit a standard competitive pattern where, regardless of whether the same or dif-
ferent farmers win the sequential units, prices are similar in magnitude (Panel A in Figure
1). Other times, one farmer wins all sequential units: he pays a high price for the first unit,
deterring other farmers from entering subsequent auctions, thus paying a very low price for
the remaining units (Panel B in Figure 1).7 This stark pattern of outcomes is consistent
across the whole sample (see Table 1 and Figure 3 that we describe in section 2).
Water Auctions as an Allocation System
Although the process of allocating water in Mula has varied slightly over time, the basic
structure has essentially remained unchanged since the 15th century. Land in Mula is divided
into regadío (irrigated land) and secano (dry land). Irrigation is permitted only in the former.
A channel system directs water from the river to regadío lands.8 Regadío are fertile lands
close to rivers, and thus allow a more eﬃcient use of the water in the region. Because it is
forbidden to irrigate lands categorized as secano, only the farmers that own a piece of regadío
land in Mula are allowed to buy water.
The mechanism to allocate water to those farmers was a sequential outcry ascending
price (or English) auction. The auctioneer sold by auction each of the units sequentially
and independently of each other. The auctioneer tracked the name of the buyer of every
unit and the price paid by the winner. The farmers could not store water in their plots.
Reselling water was forbidden. Although a farmer could steal water by opening the gate
next to his own parcel, the technology for detection of this crime was eﬀective as irrigation
was done by flood irrigation (more on this in section 2). It was easy to determine who
stole water just by identifying a flooded parcel from a farmer who did not buy water in
the auction for that specific day-schedule (conditional on rainfall). The Tribunal de los
Hombres Buenos (Council of Good Men), composed by elected members among the farmer
7In terms of purchasing power, one peseta from 1950 is approximately equivalent to 0.43 U.S. dollars from
2013 (for details see section A in the online appendix).
8The channel system was expanded from the 13th to 15th century as a response to the greater demand for
land due to population increase. The regadío land structure has not changed since the 15th century.
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community, was responsible to adjudicate conflicts between the farmers. Conflicts mostly
arose over unpermitted irrigation. We investigate this behavior in Donna and Espin-Sanchez
(2015).
The basic selling unit is a cuarta (quarter), which is the right to use water that flows
through the main channel for three hours. Water storage is done in the De La Cierva dam.
Water flows from the dam through the channels at approximately 40 liters per second. As a
result, one cuarta carries approximately 432,000 liters of water. Traditionally, auctions were
held every 21 days to complete a tanda (quota), the basic aggregate unit of irrigation time.
During our sample period, auctions were carried out every Friday.
During each session, 40 cuartas were auctioned: four cuartas for irrigation during the day
(from 7:00 AM to 7:00 PM) and four cuartas for irrigation during the night (from 7:00 PM
to 7:00 AM), for each weekday (Monday to Friday). The auctioneer first sold the 20 cuartas
corresponding to the night-time, and then the 20 cuartas corresponding to the day-time.
Within each day and night group, units were sold beginning with Monday’s four cuartas,
and finishing with Friday’s.
Unit of Analysis
The most comprehensive independent unit of analysis that could be considered is the weekly
auctions, encompassing all 40 units sold per week. This would be the relevant definition
to answer questions related to demand fluctuations generated by supply shocks, such as no
auctions due to drought or excessive rain, on an aggregate level. Alternatively, the narrowest
possible unit purchased is a cuarta (1 of the 40 weekly units). As discussed below , the
presence of SC and DMR indicate that cuartas within a day-schedule are not conditional-
independent. Moreover, they are not the relevant unit of analysis to investigate individual
farmers’ demand, nor the price pattern described below.
Our original question is motivated by the price behavior caused by the deterrence eﬀect.
This particular behavior is observed within four-units auctions and is the relevant unit of
analysis in the model. This is an implication of the way the auction is structured: twelve
hours of water (subdivided into four cuartas of three hours each) during day-time and twelve
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hours of water during night-time, each weekday. The logic behind this structure is related to
water requirements in the area.
First, water scarcity in the region made water accountability crucial. The standard unit
used to measure surface area in Mula is called tahúlla. One tahúlla is, by definition, the
surface area which can be irrigated in such a way that water level rises 1-foot high in 1
minute.9 The surface area from one-tahúlla varies from one town to another, depending on
soil conditions.10 A four-consecutive units auction—half day, twelve hours of irrigation—is,
in that sense, the amount of water that is absorbed by a regular parcela (individual piece
of land). Water requirements could and actually do diﬀer (a) across farmers depending on
farming trees and land extension, and (b) for the same farmer over time depending on past
rainfall.
Second, the irrigation technique used in Mula is flood irrigation. The farmer builds small
embankments in his parcela and water is delivered to the land by the channel system that
simply flows over the ground through the crop. Flood irrigation requires a minimum of water
delivery that, for a regular parcela, is captured by one tahúlla.
Finally, a supply-side consideration also plays a role. The reason to supply water for 12
hours (during day-time and during night-time) is to guarantee a particular and homogenous
quantity for each cuarta (which depends on water pressure because water units are defined
in hours). Given that the De La Cierva dam is continuously filled with water from the river,
spreading the supply provision across weekdays ensures the homogeneity of water units.
Our data confirm these three points, validating the relevant unit of analysis for individual
demand as four-consecutive units. The most frequent quantity purchased by farmers is
twelve hours of water (42% of sold units are 4CU). There are no observations where the same
farmer buys more than four consecutive units, nor observations where the same farmer buys
consecutive units across days (e.g. there are no observations where the same farmer buys the
last units of a day-auction, and the first units of the night-auction).
9Although close in magnitude, the traditional Murcian measure of foot is not exactly the same as the foot
measure used in the U.K. and the U.S. (Valiente 2001).
10The surface area of 1-tahúlla is 1,118 square meters in Murcia and 1,185 square meters in the old Kingdom
of Aragón, except the region of Pías Fundaciones. For further details see Vera Nicolás (2004).
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The Dataset
We combine data from four sources. The first is auction data, that we collected from the
historical archive of Mula.11 Based on bidding behavior and water availability, auction data
can be divided into three categories: (i) Regular periods, when the name of the winner, price
paid, date and time of the irrigation for each auction transaction was registered; (ii) No-supply
periods, when no auctions were conducted due to water shortage in the river or damage to
the dam or channels, usually due to intense rain; and finally (iii) No-demand periods, when
auctions were held but no one bid, leaving the registration auction sheet blank. The sample
for this study includes nearly 13 years of auction data spanning January 1954 to August
1966. Every week, 40 units (corresponding to 40 cuartas) were sold, with the exceptions
being when no auction was run (no-supply) or no bids were observed (no-demand). A total
of 17,195 auctions were run during the period under analysis.12
We link auction data to the data that we collected from the 1954/55 agricultural census
from Spain, which provides information on individual characteristics of farmers’ land.13 The
census was conducted by the Spanish government to enumerate all cultivated soil, production
crops, and agricultural assets available in the country. Individual characteristics for the
farmers’ land (potential bidders which we link with the names in the auctions data) include
the type of land and location, area, number of trees, production, and the price at which this
production was sold in the census year. During the 13-year period under analysis, there were
approximately 500 diﬀerent bidders in our sample. The number of bidders who won auctions
during a specific year was considerably lower—the mean for our sample is around 8 (see table
3, discussed in section 4)—and conditional on participation, each farmer won on average 22
units per year. This is consistent with the census data, where mean land extension is 5.5 ha
with an average of 33 trees per ha. Average annual rainfall during the period is 320 mm.
Recent irrigation studies on young citrus plantings have shown a water use of 2-5 megalitres
per hectare annually (Chott and Bradley 1997). Water savings are possible if irrigation can
be allocated to similar units of production, such as young trees or reworked sections of a
11From the section Heredamiento de Aguas, boxes No.: HA 167, HA 168, HA 169, and HA 170.
12Table A1 in the online appendix displays the frequency distribution of units in the auctions disaggregated
by the units bought sequentially by the same farmer.
13From the section Heredamiento de Aguas in the historical archive of Mula, box No. 1,210.
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property. In arid regions, like Murcia, water requirements are around 20% less and they are
lower for mature trees. Some farmers that are part of water-owner holding use their own
water instead of selling it through auctions. Although water stress during droughts aﬀects
the quality of production, trees would hardly die as a result. During a normal year without
drought, trees could survive the whole year from rainfall alone. For further details see, e.g.,
Chott and Bradley (1997), Wright (2000), and du Preez (2001). Finally, note that although
the average number of trees per farmer is 161 (see Table A2 in subsection A in the online
appendix), the average number of trees per hectare in our sample is 33, a lower number
compared to the conventional agricultural standard spacing for citrus trees that is 100 trees
per hectare.
We also link auction data to daily rainfall data for Mula and monthly price indices for
Spain, which we obtain from the Agencia Estatal de Metereología, AEMET (the National Me-
teorological Agency), and the Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España, INE (the National
Statistics Institute of Spain), respectively.
Preliminary Analysis
Mediterranean climate rainfall occurs mainly in spring and autumn. Peak water requirements
for the products cultivated in the region are reached in spring and summer, between April
and August. Soaring demand is reflected by the frequency of auctions where the same farmer
buys all four consecutive units (4CU), which reaches its peak during these months (see Figure
9 and the discussion in section 5). The frequency of 4CU is not homogenous over time, but
is related to seasonal rainfall, as can be seen in Figure 2. Overall, 42% of the units were sold
in 4CU.14 There are no observations where the same farmer buys more than four consecutive
units, nor observations where the same farmer buys consecutive units across days (e.g. there
are no observations where the same farmer buys the last units of a day-auction, and the first
units of the night-auction).
We observe only the transaction price (winning bid) and the identity of the winner (name).
(We do not observe all bids.) There is substantial price variation, both within and across
14Table A1 in section A in the online appendix displays the frequency distribution of units sold by number
of units bought by the same farmer.
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four-units auctions. Winning prices range from 0.05 pesetas (ptas) to 4,830 ptas, with a mean
of 271.6 ptas. As expected, winning prices and the frequency distribution of 4CU are strongly
correlated with past rainfall (Figure 2). Table 1 exhibits the distribution of winning prices
by both the number of consecutive units bought by the same individual (1CU, 2CU, 3CU, or
4CU) and by sequential auction (first, second, third, or fourth). The greater variation that
we observe for 4CU (with respect to non-4CU) has a well defined pattern. Although mean
prices for the first auction in 4CU are considerably higher than for non-4CU (Table 1, Panel
2: 677.6 ptas for 4CU against 211.1 ptas for 1CU, 305 ptas for 2CU, or 410 ptas for 3CU),
mean prices for fourth auctions in 4CU are the smallest (Table 1, Panel 5: 210.1 ptas for
4CU against 233.4 ptas for 1CU, 239.6 ptas for 2CU, or 311.6 ptas for 3CU). Median and
maximum prices display similar patterns.
Figure 3 presents price variation by number of consecutive auctions won by the same
individual (left panel) and by sequential auction (right panel). The figure shows that the
stark pattern of outcomes from Panels A and B in Figure 1 is consistent across the whole
sample. On the one hand, in the top panel of 3 we can see that price dispersion—as well
as the mean and median price—is higher when the same farmer wins all four consecutive
units (in the top panel, last vertical box labeled 4). On the other hand, in the bottom panel,
where we further disaggregate each box from the top panel by unit (first unit, second unit,
third unit, and fourth unit), we can see that the higher price dispersion for unit 4 in the
top panel—as well as the higher mean and median—is generated by the greater variation in
prices for first units in the lower panel (not by prices in second, third, and fourth units).
This particular pattern in prices is caused by the above mentioned deterrence eﬀect
whereby farmers exhibit diﬀerent behavior based on seasonality and rainfall, i.e., residual
demand for water. During high demand and low rainfall months, the same farmer buys
all four sequential units, paying a high price for the first unit (with respect to the median
or average price conditional on rain) and very low prices for the remaining units. During
months when demand is not high due to farming seasonalities or when rainfall is high, win-
ning prices for all units are similar in magnitude, regardless of whether the same farmer wins
all sequential units (4CU) or diﬀerent farmers win subsequent units (1CU, 2CU or 3CU).
Aggregate prices over time display consistent trends with the ones found in the empirical
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literature on sequential auctions. Figure 4 shows that, on average, per unit prices decline by
sequential unit (being the first unit of each day higher than second to fourth units), and by
day of the week (prices decline from Monday to Friday). Figure 4 also shows that per unit
prices are slightly higher during the day than during the night. High water requirements for
citrus during summer causes prices to soar during those months (Panel A in Figure 5). As
expected, prices are also higher during droughts, after conditioning on seasons (Figure 5).15
Table 2 shows that these correlations are robust after conditioning on past rain, unit,
weekday, schedule, week-of-the-year, month, and individual fixed eﬀects. The table displays
the results obtained by regressing daily unit prices on a seven-day-rain moving average (Rain
MA7 ), the rain on auction day, and the mentioned fixed eﬀects. The estimated coeﬃcients
on Rain MA7 have the expected sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level. From
column 1, a 10 millimeter (mm) increase in average rain in the previous week is associated
with a decrease of 40.5 ptas in the equilibrium price paid in the auction. The regression in
column 2 adds unit, weekday, and schedule fixed eﬀects. The estimated coeﬃcient on Rain
MA7 increases in magnitude and also has the expected sign. This regression also shows that,
as noticed in previous figures, price declines within day and across units (both for day-time
and night-time auctions) and across schedules (price is on average 110 ptas lower for night-
time auctions than for day-time auctions). The estimated coeﬃcients show that equilibrium
prices decline monotonically within the week (Figure 3). Columns 3 and 4 add, respectively,
month seasonal dummies and individual fixed eﬀects (we have 537 diﬀerent individuals in
our sample) to the specification in column 2. The estimated coeﬃcient on Rain MA7 in
column 3, though smaller, again has the expected sign and is statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Similar qualitative results are obtained in column 4; however, the estimated coeﬃcient on
Rain MA7 has increased. Note that the goodness of the fit in the last regression is 36%,
indicating that average (or ex-ante) prices are explained relatively well by observables such
as rain in the previous week and time of the allocation. This evidence supports the idea the
observable (common knowledge) components of prices in drives four-units auctions. Although
not reported, we performed an analogue analysis using average daily prices within schedule
as a robustness exercise and obtained similar results.
15See the online appendix for a discussion on droughts.
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3 The Model
As noted above, bidding behavior is a result of a complex decision process. There are three
main features from the empirical setting that need to be accounted by the model: (i) sunk
costs that farmers incur when they buy their first unit, (ii) decreasing marginal returns of
subsequent units of water, and (iii) participation costs of farmers in this market.
Sunk Costs (SC). Water is allocated during the auction and is distributed on the specific
day and time of the irrigation accordingly. Water stored in the dam is delivered to the
farmer’s plot on this date using the channel system. Except the main canal, all channels are
dug into the ground (Figure 6). On the day of the irrigation, a guard opens the corresponding
gates to allow the water to flow to the appropriate farmer’s land. These channels are land-
specific in the sense that diﬀerent areas and lands have their own system of channels which
carry water only when the corresponding gates are opened. A concern is that farmers whose
lands lie next to each other may be buying diﬀerent sequential units for the same auction.
In this case, the SC would be incurred only by the first farmer for his first unit but not for
the second farmer for his first unit. We use data on the specific location of the farmers that
we match to auction winners to analyze these situations in section 5. There is a water loss
that is incurred because water flows over a dry channel. Engineers have estimated this loss
to be between 15% and 40% (20% on average) of the water carried by one cuarta when the
channel is completely dry (see Gómez-Espín, Gil-Meseguer, and García-Marín 2006). This is
the SC incurred by the bidder for his first unit. The SC is incurred only once, for the first
unit, because water losses are associated with a wet channel are negligible. The channel dries
out after approximately 12 hours without water (González-Castaño and Llamas-Ruiz 1991).
In 1974 the system of sub-canals was made of concrete, instead of just dug in the ground, to
prevent such losses (González-Castaño and Llamas-Ruiz 1991).
Decreasing Marginal Returns (DMR). The second feature refers to the decreasing
marginal returns (DMR) eﬀect. The classic textbook case for DMR is appropriate for our
empirical application. Given that the amount of land owned by each farmer is fixed, marginal
productivity of subsequent units of water is decreasing. When assessing the relative impor-
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tance of DMR, the impact in summer would generally be greater than in autumn. More
generally, one would expect DMR to be aﬀected by season and rain. When water require-
ments are high, the slope of the marginal productivity function will be relatively flat; this
is likely to occur in spring and summer. On the other hand, when water requirements are
low, the slope of the marginal productivity function will be steeper; this is likely to happen
in autumn or winter.
Participation Costs. There are several reasons why farmers face participation costs in this
market. The main component of participation costs correspond to the hassle costs associated
with active bidding. Only a fraction of the individuals who attended a Friday auction were
actively engaged in the bidding for a particular sequential auction of water and not everyone
who was present participated in every auction (Botía, Francisco, personal interview, Murcia,
June 17, 2013).16 As von der Fehr (1994) points out, a reasonable assumption for why only
a portion of attendees participate may be that they consider it so unlikely to that they will
win at a price below what they will be willing to pay, that they are not willing to bother to
engage in bidding. We expect this type of costs to be very small but positive.17
Empirical evidence from our data is consistent with the assertion that farmers dislike
participation, facing positive entry costs as they do. We observe multiple weeks per year
when auctions were run, farmers showed up and bought the first units of water, but no one
bid for the last units. As there was no reservation price and the minimum bid increment
was cents, they could have potentially won all the remaining units bidding one cent. To the
contrary, they decided not to bid and instead left the auction. For example, on January 22,
1954, units 1 to 16 were sold to seven diﬀerent farmers but no one bid for units 17 to 20
(Figure 7). In 1954 we observe similar behavior for 14 weeks,18 and this is consistent along
the remaining years in our sample. To infer participation costs, we use 2, 423 auctions where
some bidders where present and no one bid for the last units, i.e., auctions similar to the
one in Figure 7. Our interpretation is that the utility for all bidders is smaller than the
16A summary is available online in the online appendix at http://www.jdonna.org/water-auctions-web.
17Note that the results would be the same if participation costs were zero. However, the equilibrium when
goods are complements would not be unique (see section 2).
18Weeks of January 22, February 5, April 5, May 1, May 8, May 15, May 22, May 29, June 5, June 12,
July 3, July 10, November 26, and December 3.
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participation cost, conditional on covariates. We use this information to partially identify
participation costs (see page 30).
Set Up
We use the three main specific features from the empirical setting to build our model. A
SC is incurred only for the first unit bought whereas DMR are present for second to fourth
units. The relative importance of the SC and DMR generate a trade-oﬀ, whereby bidders
play one strategy of another based on whether diﬀerent units are complements or substitutes.
A simple way to show this intuition is by assuming that the initial SC is proportional to the
value of water, and DMR are linear in the number of units bought. We parametrize the SC
eﬀect by (1  ⇢1) vi. The interpretation of SC is the percentage of water loss from the first
unit bought because water is flowing through a dry channel (hence, the SC is proportional
to the valuation of the bidder for the unit of water). When the SC is zero, ⇢1 = 1. In this
case the bidder obtains the complete first unit (i.e. 100 percent of the first unit). When the
SC is positive, ⇢1 < 1, a percentage of the water is lost and the bidder obtains ⇢1 of the first
unit (i.e. ⇢1 ⇥ 100 percent of the first unit). One would expect that, conditional on rain,
water loss would be constant within season and relatively higher (lower ⇢1) in summer.19 We
parametrize the DMR of unit k by ⇢k for k = 1, 2, . . . , K. Let ⇢ be the vector of parameters
that characterizes marginal utilities, i.e. ⇢ ⌘ (⇢1, ⇢2, . . . , ⇢K). Then, the marginal utility for
bidder i for each unit k is:
MUki = ⇢k · vi,
where vi, known only by bidder i, is a scalar that captures the valuation that the bidder
assigns to their first (complete) unit of water, i.e., when ⇢1 = 0 we have MU1i = vi.
We consider vi to be independent and identically distributed on the interval R+, according
to the cumulative distribution function F (vi), for all bidders i = 1, . . . , N . We assume that
F (vi) admits a continuous density f (vi) > 0 and has full support. It is assumed that
E[vi] < 1. Let µ be the parameter that fully characterizes the distribution F (vi). The
19We discuss variation of SC across auctions (conditional on covariates) in page 27 in the article.
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private valuation, vi, is known only by bidder i, and it is learned before entering the first
auction. We do not consider the case where farmers might have diﬀerent valuations for
diﬀerent units of water. The reason for this is that the units are identical and we condition
on observables that may aﬀect the price of water in the econometric specification (see section
4). We obtained similar results by allowing the valuation for subsequent units to be diﬀerent
draws from the same distribution. The exposition of the model, however, becomes more
cumbersome.
Farmers are price takers in both the input and the output markets. Farmers compete in
the output market and sell their production in the international market (e.g. international
markets for apricot, oranges, lemon, etc.). The market share of the output produced by
Mula’s farmers is negligible in the international market, thus the prices of the output in the
international market are not aﬀected by Mula’s production. The farmers who compete in the
auction are only those with irrigable land, and they make a small fraction of all farmers in
Mula. They are price takers in the market for inputs, such as labor and manure. Thus, there
are no common components to the valuation of the bidders, conditional on the observables
(e.g. rainfall, day of the week, time of the day, etc.).
The seller wants to allocate K identical units. These units are auctioned oﬀ sequentially
by the seller using an English ascending price auction for every unit. All participating
bidders observe the total number of individuals who participate in the auction, N . After
every auction, each participant observes both the price paid by the winner and the winner’s
identity. The seller continues to run subsequent auctions sequentially until all the units are
allocated. The primitives of the model, (K,N, µ, ⇢), are common knowledge. We assume that
all bidders share the same utility function, U (·). We think this is reasonable in the present
setting for the following reasons. First, all plots are located within a small area (less than 4
km2) and have the same land quality and weather. Second, although farmers may harvest
diﬀerent crops, they all have similar water needs per tree across the year. Idiosyncratic
diﬀerences in water needs in a specific week are captured in our econometric specification
by the farmer’s type, vi. Finally, the system of canals is such that all the plots are located
within a few hundred meters from the mail canal. Sub-canals coming from the main canal
have all about the same length and are dug into the ground.
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The strategy set for every bidder is the vector   ⌘  yki , bki  k=1,...,Ki=1,...,N , where yki 2 {0, 1},
yki = 1 indicates that bidder i participates in the auction for unit k (yki = 0 if bidder i does
not participate in the auction for unit k), and bki is the maximum amount that bidder i is
willing to pay for unit k. Bidders play sequentially, or stage by stage. This means that they
choose  ki =
 
yki , b
k
i
 
after learning the outcome of the previous (k   1) auctions. Bidders
participating in auction k observe the price at which each bidder is no longer active (bids
are observable) except for the winning bid. The information transmission is consistent with
the auction being an English (or ascending price) auction rather than a second price auction.
We model the game as in a button auction. Each bidder holds a button while the price
continuously rises. A bid for bidder i is the value at which bidder i stops holding the button.
When there are only two bidders active (holding the button) and one of them releases the
button, the auction ends. The active bidder wins the object and pays the price at which the
runner up stopped.20
The seller allocates the unit to the highest bidder: xkj 2 {0, 1} and xkj = 1 when j =
argmaxi
 
bki
 
(and 0 otherwise), at a price equal to the second highest bid: pk = bkl , where
l = argmaxi 6=j
 
bki
 
. Let Xki ⌘
Pj=k
j=1 x
j
i .be the number of units that bidder i has won before
participating in auction k. If only one bidder participates in a specific auction this bidder
obtains the object for free. Each object is either allocated to one of the N bidders, or it is
lost if none of the bidders decide to participate in the auction.
Participation decisions in each auction are done simultaneously by all bidders. To take
part in every auction each bidder incurs a participation cost, c > 0, at the beginning of the
period. If only one bidder participates, this bidder obtains the object for free but it bears
the participation cost, c, nonetheless. The process is then repeated in every period.21 As
discussed in previous subsection, the assumption of positive entry costs is consistent with the
data in our empirical setting, where we observe no demand for some of the units, even though
the reservation price is zero. The interpretation is that, in those situations where no-demand
is observed, the value that bidders assign to that unit is smaller than the participation cost,
20 See Cassady (1967) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) for details.
21Bidders enter the auction if, and only if, the expected utility they obtain from the game is positive. See
von der Fehr (1994) for a discussion of entry when the goods are complements or the conditions needed for
entry when the entry cost in the first auction is positive.
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c.22
The ex-post utility for a bidder who buys l units and participates in m auctions is:
Ui (l,m, vi; ⇢, c) =
lX
k=1
⇢k · vi  
KX
k=1
yki · c =
lX
k=1
⇢k · vi  m · c.
In the remainder of the article we refer to vN :N as the highest realization of the random
variables v1, . . . , vn drawn independently from CDFs F1, . . . , FN (one draw from each distri-
bution), and vN 1:N , as the second highest realization. More generally, vj:N is the jth order
statistic for a sample of size N from the distribution F (vi).
We follow von der Fehr (1994) and assume that the entry cost is small enough so that
the expected payoﬀ of entering is greater than zero for all bidders. This assumption has no
impact on the bidding behavior of subsequent auctions because no information is revealed
before entering the first auction, but it greatly simplifies the notation and the analysis. We
summarize this in the next assumption A0.
Assumption 0 [A0]: E [Ui (l,m, vi; ⇢, c)   0] . If A0 is not satisfied, then some bidders may
not enter the first auction. In the article we consider only symmetric equilibria. Thus, in the
first stage all bidders play the same entry strategy.23 This strategy is a threshold strategy,
i.e., each bidder enters the game if, and only if, its own valuation, vi, is greater than some
common threshold, v⇤. This threshold value depends on the expected value of participating
in the game. In particular, v⇤ is the valuation that would make a player indiﬀerent between
entering the game or not, because its expected utility of participating would be zero. The
expected utility would be a function of the parameters of the game and the number of players.
It is straightforward to see that, when considering symmetric equilibria, the expected util-
ity of entering the game after the first auction (second, third, or fourth auctions) is always
lower than that of entering the game in the first auction. In other words, individuals whose
valuation was below v⇤ and did not enter the first auction, never find it optimal to enter
subsequent stages. The previous result implies that we observe only bids from individuals
22We later use this information to partially identify participation costs (see page 30). See above in this
section for justification of this assumption in our specific empirical setting.
23By restricting attention to symmetric equilibria we rule out equilibria where some bidders do not enter
the first auction to learn about the types of its opponents, and then decide whether to enter the remaining
auctions.
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that enter the first stage. In the data, we do not observe whether individuals bid in previous
auctions, we observe only winning bids. Hence, we cannot recover the unconditional under-
lying distribution of bids, F (vi), but rather the underlying distribution of bids conditional
on entering the first auction, i.e., F ⇤ (vi) = F (vi|vi > v⇤). Note that when c goes to zero,
v⇤ goes to zero and the two distributions coincide. Given that our estimates for c are very
small (less than 14 cents of a peseta), the diﬀerence between both distributions is small. For
a discussion on selection due to entry costs see, e.g., Li and Zheng (2009, 2012) and Marmer,
Shneyerov, and Xu (2013).
Four-Units Auctions.
Our goal in this theoretical section is to characterize only the results that summarize the
equilibrium price behavior used for the structural estimation, rather than a full characteri-
zation of the equilibrium of the model.24 The next two assumptions allow us to determine
the regime under which the game is being played.
Assumption 1 [A1]: ⇢1  ⇢4.
Assumption 2 [A2]: ⇢1 + ⇢2  ⇢3 + ⇢4.
When K = 4, we call it a strict complements regime when A1 and A2 holds. We call a weak
substitutes regime when neither A1 nor A2 holds. The following results summarize equilib-
rium winning price behavior as a function of the model’s primitives (valuations, SC, DMR,
and participation costs). We later use these results for the estimation. We consider only pure
strategy symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).25 All proofs and extensions are in
section B in the online appendix.
24We provide a full characterization of the game in the case where good are substitutes and there are
two units to be sold in Appendix B. As shown there, the equilibrium strategies when goods are substitutes
may involve pooling at several intervals. Using such information for the structural estimation would require
imposing additional assumptions on the behavior of the farmers (e.g. how farmers form their beliefs in
such cases). However, we can still estimate the parameters of interest without imposing these additional
restrictions nor solving the complete game.
25When K = 2, cases where ⇢2  0 and ⇢1 = ⇢2 are equivalent to von der Fehr (1994), in subsections 3.2
and 3.4, respectively. Uniqueness, however, is not proved by von der Fehr in any of those cases.
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Proposition 1. In a strict complements regime (i.e., when A1 and A2 hold) the pure strategy
symmetric PBE is:
• First auction:
- Participation: bidder i will always participate in the first auction, i.e. y1i = 1.
- Bidding Strategy: b1i (vi) =
4P
k=1
⇢k · vi   4c.
• Second, third, and fourth auctions:
- Participation: bidder i participates in each auction if, and only if, she won the
first auction, i.e. yki = 1 if, and only if, x1i = 1.
- Bidding Strategy: If bidder i participates in each auction (yki = 1 for k = 2, 3, 4),
she will continue bidding until the price reaches its own valuation for all remaining
units, bli(vi) =
4P
k=l
⇢k · vi   (4  l) c.
Corollary 1. In a strict complements regime (i.e., when A1 and A2 hold) the ex-post utility
of the winner satisfies:
4X
k=1
pk =
4X
k=1
⇢k · vN 1:N   4c. (1)
Lemma 1. In a weak substitutes regime (i.e., when neither A1 nor A2 holds) the probability
that a bidder diﬀerent from the winner enters the last auction is decreasing in the participation
cost, c. Moreover, this probability goes to 1 when c goes to zero, i.e.:
Lim
c!0
 
Pr
 
yKi = 1 | x1j = 1, i 6= j
  
= 1.
Corollary 2. In a weak substitutes regime (i.e., when neither A1 nor A2 holds) the ex-post
marginal utility of the winner in the last auction, depending on how many units the winner
won, satisfies:
If the winner won all four units:
⇢4 · vN :N   p4 = ⇢1 · vN 1:N   c. (2)
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If the winner won three units, two out of the first three, and the last one:
⇢3 · vN :N   p4 = ⇢2 · vN 1:N   c. (3)
In equation 2 the winner wins all the units, so its marginal utility is ⇢4 ·vN :N . Because the
winner won all units, the runner up did not win any unit and its marginal utility is ⇢1 ·vN 1:N .
In equation 3 the winner wins three units, so its marginal utility is ⇢3 · vN :N . The runner-up
won one of the previous units and its marginal utility is: ⇢2 · vN 1:N .
4 Estimation
Econometric Specification
We estimate the model via maximum likelihood using an exponential distribution for the
individual valuations. In this subsection we describe how the likelihood is formed and how
we account for rain expectations and auction heterogeneity.
Regime Determination. The predicted price pattern by our model for each each regime
(strict complements and weak substitutes) provides us with a straightforward method to
determine the regime being played. When goods are strict complements, very low prices—or,
according to the auctioneer who ran the auctions, symbolic prices that are “close” to zero
(Botía, interview, available in the online appendix)—are paid, by the winner of the first unit,
for the second, third, and fourth units (Panel B in Figure 1). Thus, the diﬀerence between
the price paid for the first and the remaining units is large. When goods are substitutes, the
units might be bought by diﬀerent bidders and the prices of all four units are similar (Panel
A in Figure 1). Thus, the diﬀerence between the price paid for the first and the remaining
units is negligible. This allows to separate the data into four categories by looking at the
identities of the winner (i.e. whether the same bidder bought all the four units), and the
diﬀerence between the price paid for the first and the remaining units:26 In principle one
could estimate a simultaneous equation switching regression model along the lines of Porter
26See section C in the online appendix for details.
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(1983) and Ellison (1994). In such model, the parameters that characterize demand would be
estimated as in this section conditional on the regime classification; the regime classification
would be unknown, and the parameters governing the distribution of the regime classification
would be estimated by, e.g., an adaptation of the E-M algorithm (Kiefer 1980). However, in
our case we can determine the regime classification directly by examining the data, from the
observed prices. The first-order distinguishing feature of the regime are the predicted price
patterns by the theoretical model. Panels A and B in Figure 1 show one instance of how
these patterns look throughout the data. This is the most straightforward and, thus, our
preferred approach.
a) Same bidder wins all four units and goods are in a strict complements regime (i.e.
when A1 and A2 hold),
b) Same bidder wins all four units and goods are in a weak substitutes regime (i.e. when
neither A1 nor A2 holds),
c) Last winner also bought two out of the first three units, three units in total, and goods
are in a weak substitutes regime (i.e., when neither A1 nor A2 holds),
d) Otherwise.
Categories a, b, and c define three separate pricing strategies. In region a, winning prices
are determined by equation 1. In region b, winning prices are determined by equation 2. In
region c, winning prices are determined by equation 3. Let Da be an indicator variable that
equals 1 if the winning price is in region a, and 0 otherwise. Define analogously Db, Dc for
regions b, and c, respectively. See section 4 for a discussion about the regions of the likelihood
and the covariates. Note that we do not use the data in region d. In order to use the data in
region d we would need to make additional assumptions: (i) regarding the parameter space,
(ii) regarding the distribution of types, and (iii) to fully solve the model when neither A1 or
A2 holds. This is beyond the scope of this article. As we discussed above, we are able to
recover the parameters of interest using only the data in regions a, b, and c.
Identification. For the case of an English auction, the conditional distribution of private
valuations is non-parametrically identified when the transaction price and the number of
bidders are observable (Athey and Haile 2002). This result is immediately useful in our
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sequential English auction model where bids are conditional-independent draws from a dis-
tribution FV (.) and the equilibrium (observed) transaction price is a function of the second
highest valuation, vN 1:N . Consider the strict complements regime. Winning prices are de-
termined by equation 1. The distribution of valuations is identified up to the multiplying
constant,
4P
k=1
⇢k, using equation 1 and the result from Athey and Haile (2002). Identification
of the remaining parameters, ⇢k, would require four additional independent restrictions (in
addition to equation 1). Two additional restrictions are provided by the model from corol-
lary 2 (equations 2 and 3). But we observe only winning bids in the data. Then, two of
the four ⇢k, k = 1, . . . , 4, are not identified without further structure. We use a specification
with linear DMR due to the mentioned data limitation. Linear DMR impose two additional
restrictions. First, we define ⇢1 = 1 ↵ and ⇢2 = 1  . (Note that these are not restrictions
on the parameter space.) We then restrict the parameter space by assuming that ⇢3 = 1 2 
and ⇢4 = 1 3  (i.e. linear DMR). Hence, we have three independent restrictions (equations
1, 2, and 3) and three parameters to estimate (µ,↵,  ), where µ is a parameter that fully
characterizes the distribution of valuations.27 With observability of all bids (not just the
winning bids as in our empirical setting), ⇢3 and ⇢4 would be identified and we would not
need to impose the linearity assumption on marginal returns.28
Equation 2 establishes the relation between ⇢1 and µ (↵ and µ). Equation 3 establishes
the relation between ⇢2 and µ (  and µ). Finally, equation 1 establishes the relation between
⇢1, ⇢2, ⇢3, ⇢4 and µ (↵,   and µ). If DMR are not linear, then equations 2 and 3 would
still hold. That is, ⇢1 = 1   ↵ measures the value of first unit bought, net of the sunk cost
and ⇢2 = 1     measures the value of the second unit bought, including a decline in the
value due to DMR. However, equation 1 would not hold. In particular, the term multiplying
vN 1:N would no longer be equal to
4P
k=1
⇢k =
⇥
4  ↵  6 Ct
⇤
, but would still be a function of
↵ and  Ct . That means that the estimation method proposed here could be applied to other
specific (non-linear) functional forms of DMR just by changing equation 1. In general, we
can characterize the DMR function as ⇢k = k ( ), while fixing ⇢1 = 1   ↵ and ⇢2 = 1    
without loss of generality. In the linear case we let ⇢k = k ( ) = 1   (k   1) , but the
27Note, however, that the distribution of private valuations is non-parametrically identified from the result
from Athey and Haile 2002.
28Note that assumptions A1 and A2 are equivalent to assume that ↵   4 .
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estimation method could incorporate other non-linear functional forms, which would change
only equation 1.
Specification of Decreasing Marginal Returns (DMR). For our estimation we allow
DMR,  t, to vary across auctions holding fixed SC, ↵ (more about this below). We allow
 t to vary with farmers’ expectations of rain in each auction t = 1, . . . , T . We proxy these
expectations by actual (i.e. observed) future rain, so  t =  0 +  1RFt , where RFt is a dummy
variable (defined next) that is linked to expectations about future rain in t, and  0 and  1
are parameters. RFt = 1 if farmers expect that rain is going to be positive (for the day for
which they are buying water) and zero otherwise. We further let  t have diﬀerent intercepts
in each regime:
 St =  
S
0 +  
S
1R
F
t
 Ct =  
C
0 +  
C
1 R
F
t
. (4)
Table 4 provides an heuristic argument to understand the reasons behind this equation.
The table presents probit regressions of a dummy variable identifying the regime (strict
complements vs. weak substitutes) on future rain and other covariates. We interpret future
rain in these regressions as a proxy for aggregate expected future rain for the farmers. Table 4
shows that low expected rain and high demand months (May to August) significantly increase
the likelihood of being in a strict complements regime. The interpretation is that farmers have
some information (expectations) about future rain. Although the idiosyncratic component
of this information is captured by their type, vi, the common component is captured by  t.
When farmers expect, on aggregate, no rain in a given day, they will play the strategies
corresponding to the strict complements regime. Seasonality also aﬀects the demand for
water and aﬀects the position of a farmer in the production curve. The results in Table
4 show that it is the slope on the marginal return eﬀect that drives the change of regime,
holding fixed SC.
In our parametrization we fix ↵ across auctions and season but we allow  t to vary. We
expect ↵ to vary across auctions and seasons as well. But this variation is not separately
identified from the variation on  t because it is the relative magnitude of the eﬀects that
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matters. The rationale for why we let  t vary (instead of ↵) is that a regime switch is driven
by the (residual) demand for water by the farmers, as determined by rain and seasonal eﬀects.
In other words, we expect the changes in  t to be more important in magnitude than the
changes in ↵. Therefore, the estimated changes in  t should be interpreted relative to changes
with respect to ↵.29
The Likelihood. The econometric problem consists of finding the parameter that char-
acterizes the common distribution of valuations F and the structural parameters that best
rationalize the bidding data. As discussed in the previous section, the bid levels at which
bidders drop out of the auctions are not observed, except the bidder with the second-highest
valuation. We estimate the model via maximum likelihood assuming that farmers draw inde-
pendent and private valuations from an exponential distribution at each four-units auction,
conditional on observed auction-specific covariates. (We discuss the assumptions below in
section 4.)
Our model and the context of the market under analysis provide insight on how the
characteristics of farmers and auctions should aﬀect private values, but it oﬀers little guidance
on the functional form of this distribution. We assume that farmers’ valuations, vi, follow an
an exponential distribution for each four-units auction.30 In section 5 we report the results
from a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test where the null hypothesis that the distribution of private
valuations are draws from an exponential distribution cannot be rejected.
Let vi ⇠ F (v;µ), where F (v;µ) = (1  e µv) 1 {v   0} is the CDF of an exponen-
tial distribution that is characterized by the scalar µ > 0. Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4
jointly identify the parameter vector
 
µ,↵,  C0 ,  
S
0 ,  
C
1 ,  
S
1
 
, conditional on the regime and
exogenous covariates, RFt . Note that the third equation in the system is, actually, p4b =
Max {(1  ↵)vN 1:N , (1   ) vN 2:N}, because we do not know whether the runner-up in the
last auction was the bidder who already won one unit or a bidder without previous purchases.
However, when N is large, (1   ↵)vN 1:N < (1   ) vN 2:N if   ' ↵. But, in the case that
  ' ↵, the same bidder will not win three out of four units. That is, in an auction where
29We obtained similar results to the ones on Tables 5 and 6 fixing   and allowing ↵t to vary in each auction
t = 1, . . . , T .
30In our earlier working paper Donna and Espin-Sanchez (2012) we used an Exponentiated Gamma (EG)
distribution, which gives a closed-form solution for the PDF of the jth order statistic.
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N is large and the same bidder wins three out of four units, we expect   to be significantly
greater than ↵. Therefore, the equation can be simplified to p4b = (1   ↵)vN 1:N . The full
system of equations is given by:
4P
k=1
pka =
⇥
4  ↵  6 Ct
⇤
vN 1:N   4c
p4b = (1  ↵)vN 1:N   c
p4c = (1   St )vN 1:N   c
 St =  
S
0 +  
S
1R
F
t
 Ct =  
C
0 +  
C
1 R
F
t .
(5)
Let ✓ ⌘ (↵,  C0 ,  S0 ,  C1 ,  S1 ) and let vi be a conditional-independent draw from F (vi;µ|✓, RFt , Djt ).
Then, the likelihood function is given by:
L(vi;µ | ✓, RFt , Djt ) =
TY
t=1
fN 1:N
 P4
k=1 p
k
t + 4c
4  ↵  6( C0 +  C1 RFt )
;µ | ✓, RFt
!Dat
⇥
fN 1:N
 
p4t + c
1  ↵ ;µ | ✓, R
F
t
!Dbt
⇥ fN 1:N
 
p4t + c
1   S0 +  CS RFt
;µ | ✓, RFt
!Dct
,
(6)
where fN 1:N(v;µ) is the probability density function (PDF) of the (N   1)th order statis-
tic from a sample of N from the exponential distribution of valuations F , and Dat , Dbt , Dct
are, respectively, indicator variables for cases a, b, and c, as defined above at the beginning
of this subsection .
Auction Heterogeneity. We allow the mean of the distribution of valuations to depend
on various characteristics that are drawn from the data. We assume that observed prices
follow a linear function of the following exogenous variables and estimate all parameters
using the likelihood function:31
31Laﬀont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) assume that private values follow a log-normal distribution and let
the mean of the logarithm of the valuations be a linear function of exogenous characteristics. Haile and
Tamer (2003) condition on covariates by constructing the conditional empirical distribution functions using
Gaussian kernels.
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µ = E
 
vit
 
= Z 0t  =  0+ 1R
P
t + 2
 
RPt
 2
+ 3Nightt+
5X
k=2
 2+kDay
k
t +
12X
k=2
 6+kMonth
k
t . (7)
The first exogenous variable, RPt , refers to Past Rain, a moving average of the daily rain
beginning seven days prior to the date of the auction; we include a quadratic term to allow
for non linearities in past rain. The second variable is a dummy variable that equals one if
the water was bought for night use. The next four variables are a set of dummy variables
for each weekday. Finally, the last eleven variables are a complete set of monthly dummy
variables to condition on seasonality. Water prices soar in this market during the dry summer
and drop in winter. We accommodate these shocks to demand with seasonal monthly dummy
variables. We estimate the parameter vector   by maximum likelihood using the equation
in 7 to model the mean distribution of valuations, µ. See sections E and F in the online
appendix for details about the estimation procedure.
Identification and Estimation of Participation Costs. Although, throughout the pre-
vious estimation procedure, participation costs, c, have been fixed at an arbitrary small mag-
nitude, we recover them from our data. We use our model and data where auctions were run,
no bids observed and farmers were present, along with the structural estimates. Participation
costs are identified by the necessary condition for a bidder to bid in the first auction that is
given by:
(1  ↵)vN :N < c.
More generally, a condition that additionally involves second, third, and fourth marginal
utilities for the case where the bidder also enters the individual auctions for two, three or
four units should be considered. In these cases, participation costs are also greater than the
average marginal utility for second, third, and fourth units. Formally:
Max
⇢
1  ↵, 2  ↵   t
2
,
3  ↵  2 t
3
,
4  ↵  3 t
4
 
vN :N < c. (8)
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Note that, when ↵ <  t, the former condition is suﬃcient, implying the latter. In our
econometric specification the structural parameter ↵ is fixed whereas the parameter  t varies
according to the farmers’ expectations of (exogenous) future rain. One would expect to
observe auctions without bids when farmers’ expectations for rain, as captured by actual
future rain, are high (which in the model is represented by a relatively high  t). Therefore,
absence of bids will occur only when ↵ <  t, thus, the former identification restriction is
suﬃcient.
Analogously, using the model and the remaining data not used in the structural estima-
tion, we obtain an upper bound using that participation cost are lower than the minimum
registered price (conditional on covariates, sunk cost, and DMR).
Discussion
Conditional Independent Private Valuations (CIPV). For the estimation we assume
that farmers have independent and private valuations at each four-units auction, conditional
on observed auction-specific covariates. The first justification for CIPV is that each bidding
farmer (who may or may not be a water-owner) has his own land extension, and his own
mixture of trees and crops. This eliminates a strict common value scenario. In addition, in
the econometric specification we account for observables that aﬀect all farmers in a similar
way such as (past and future) rainfall, schedule of the auction, day of the week, weather
seasonality, etc. (see section 4 for details). Second, the products sold are units of water.
Assuming that farmers have private information from other farmers about the characteris-
tics of this product is not in line with the homogeneous nature of water units. Finally, the
conditional-independence assumption is the most credible in our context, given the varying
nature of farming products and soil conditions across farmers. To understand why, recall
that sellers in the water market are a holding formed by the water owners and buyers are
farmers that own fertile land. Around 500 diﬀerent farmers are observed to win auctions in
our sample. Not all of these farmers show up at every auction or decide to participate if
they are present. Farming products cultivated in the area are mainly fruit and citrus trees
(lemon, orange, peach, mandarin, and apricot), and vegetables (tomato, lettuce, and onion).
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The amount of water required by the trees depends on the time of the year and type of
crop (citrus trees should not be irrigated daily). Moreover, and given that we condition on
seasonality, water requirements vary across products. For example, water needs for grape-
fruit and lemons are about 20% higher than those for oranges, whereas water requirements
for mandarins are about 10% less. Ground conditions (which also vary across areas where
diﬀerent farmers have their land) also aﬀect water necessity.32 The variations across farmers
generated by these factors provide support for the fact that the conditional-independence
assumption seems satisfied, given that each day the market is quite specific and because we
work with data for four-consecutive auctions as a unit of analysis (sequential auctions). Our
justification of the CIPV paradigm is in line with the literature on empirical auctions. For
first price descending auctions see, e.g., Laﬀont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) in an application
to agricultural products (greenhouse eggplants in Marmande, France) where the number of
bidders vary between 11 and 18. For English auctions, Haile and Tamer (2003) apply their
limited structure model to U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, where the number of bidders
vary from 2 to 12.
Auction Heterogeneity. Observed heterogeneity across auctions arises due to seasonal
eﬀects, rain, and the day and time of the week when the auction occurs. This means that
the distribution of private values for the tth auction, Ft(vi) is not constant across auctions.
In our estimation, we recover the family of distributions F (vi|Zt,  ). That is, we assume for
every four-units auction that Ft(vi) = F (vi|Zt,  ), where   2 Rk is a parameter vector and
Zt is a vector of fully observed characteristics describing the environment of the tth auction.
We described the inclusion of these covariates above.
Number of Potential Bidders. The number of potential bidders in each auction, Nt,
is not observed. Moreover, it is not identified (Athey and Haile 2002). We assume that it
is constant for every four-units auction, Nt = N . Table 3 displays the timing structure for
diﬀerent bidders in our sample. For our estimation, we let the number of potential bidders
in each auction be the yearly average of diﬀerent farmers who won auctions in our sample.
32Table A3 in the online appendix displays appropriate intervals for watering citrus.
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The agricultural products that are cultivated in the area are mainly citrus trees, which are
harvested once per year. The number of diﬀerent bidders who bought at least one unit during
a specific year constitutes a good approximation of the number of farmers who were actively
bidding in each four-units auction during that year. The monthly average of diﬀerent bidders
who bought water in the sample (years 1954 to 1966) is 8.31 (Table 3). We estimate the
model using diﬀerent values of N for robustness.33
Unobserved Heterogeneity. Throughout, we have assumed that the vector Zt of covari-
ates is fully observed by the econometrician. In our environment, unobserved heterogeneity
implies that the distribution of bids may not be conditional-independent across t. All farm-
ers may, for example, observe some factor unobservable by the researcher that shifts the
location of the distribution values. This unobserved heterogeneity could lead to correlation
among bidders’ valuations, causing an identification problem and inconsistent estimates to
arise. From the agricultural census data we observe individual characteristics of the farmers
which we are able to link to the winning bids. Given the structure of the agricultural water
market we are modeling, it does not appear to be an important concern once we consider the
homogeneity of the selling good and the observed characteristics we introduce in our estima-
tions (seasonality, past and future rain, among others). Modeling unobserved heterogeneity
may require additional assumptions on the behavior of unobservables, such as independence,
separability, strict monotonicity, and is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion
on this issue see, among others, Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011) for an application to timber
auctions, and Krasnokutskaya (2011) for a semi-parametric approach to Michigan highway
procurement contracts. Roberts (2009) uses information contained in reserve prices to al-
low bidders’ private signals to depend on the realization of the unobserved heterogeneity.
Balat (2013) allows for unobserved heterogeneity using dynamic auctions in the highway
procurement market.
33In Table 5 we present the results for N 2 {8, 10}. We have performed a sensitivity analysis to diﬀerent
values of Nt that are consistent with the pattern observed in Table 3 and the evidence described in section
2. In addition, we broke the sample into four periods and performed the estimation independently in each
period allowing the mean value of Nt to vary by period. We obtained similar results to the ones reported in
Table 5.
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Dynamic Strategic Considerations. The way in which the auction system is carried out
every week raises the question of the importance of dynamic strategic considerations between
four-units auctions both among days (Monday to Friday for a specific schedule) and between
schedules (day-time vs night-time for a specific day). Tables 1 and 2 show that winning prices
decline across days (for a given schedule) and at night (for a given day), which is consistent
with the literature on empirical sequential auctions. These dynamic strategic considerations
are outside the scope of the present investigation, and we abstract from them in the model.
We account for these issues with a set of dummy variables. Our reduced-form regressions
in Table 2 show correlations between average winning prices “within four-units blocks” and
a set of covariates. These covariates (which include “schedule” dummy variables for day vs.
night irrigation, a set of dummy variables for the day of the week of the irrigation, and a
“seasonal” set of monthly dummy variables) account for these dynamics, in that the residuals
after including these covariates (i.e., both the residuals from the reduced-form regressions in
Table 2, and the residuals from the structural model in Tables 5 and 6) are uncorrelated with
any of the observables in our data. Thus, we believe that our structural empirical analysis
does not suﬀer from an omitted variable bias, and that the dummy variables eﬀectively
account for those dynamic issues.
In particular we can distinguish three types of dynamics in this market: a) Within four-
units blocks; b) across four-units blocks (within week); c) across weeks. Incorporating all
these dynamics into the structural model would be too cumbersome. We are addressing a)
in the current article, and we address c) in Donna and Espin-Sanchez (2016). In this article
we use “schedule” dummy variables to account for b), and seasonal eﬀects to account for c).
Moreover, in this article we could have assumed that each bidder observes a vector of ten
values at the beginning of the week, each value corresponding to the valuation, vi, for each
of the ten four-units cuartas. In this case units across four-units block would be ex-ante
equivalent, and the dynamics across four-units block would be modeled as in McAfee and
Vincent (1993). Alternatively we could assume that bidders begin the auction on Friday
knowing only their valuations for the Monday-night cuartas, and only after that auction is
finished they learn their valuation for the next set of four cuartas (in this case, Tuesday-
night), and so on. In that case the proper model would be Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), and
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the objects would be stochastically equivalent.
However, it is important to note that, even if present, dynamic behavior considerations do
not invalidate the model’s assumptions. As emphasized above, the conditional-independent
units of analysis are four-units auctions (not day-auctions of eight units or week-auctions of
40 units) which, conditional on covariates, are homogeneous goods. As can be seen from
the correlations presented in Table 2, previous patterns are consistent along the whole sam-
ple and robust to the inclusion of a whole set of fixed eﬀects and covariates. The principal
diﬀerence between prices in these four-units auctions is related to the uncertainty of future
rain. As it is explained above, we include covariates for schedule, day-of-the-week, and past
rain in our structural estimation that capture technological or strategic eﬀects. Future rain,
on the other hand, is also included as a proxy for farmers’ beliefs to account for these pos-
sible strategic behaviors unaccounted by previous covariates. In that sense, our estimates
should be interpreted as four-units day-schedule specific auctions, conditional on past rain
and seasonality. It seems implausible that after accounting for these observables and unob-
servables,34 and given that the relevant unit of analysis is the four-units auction, dynamic
behavior would aﬀect our results concerning individual demand. Once we condition on these
covariates, the concern that a bidder’s outside option would vary according to the day of the
week (or schedule) is addressed by redefining the idiosyncratic individual valuation in such
a way that the new one be the original valuation net of the outside option. By normalizing
the outside option of Friday-night to zero the model’s assumptions remain valid.
Regions of the Likelihood and Covariates. Another concern may be selection in the
regions of the likelihood. As emphasized in section 4, categories a, b, and c define three
separate pricing strategies. (In region a, winning prices are determined by equation 1. In
region b, winning prices are determined by equation 2. In region c, winning prices are
determined by equation 3.) Table A4 in the online appendix displays a comparison of the
covariates in the three regions of the likelihood. As expected, prices are higher in the strict
complements regime (region a) relative to the weak substitutes regime (regions b and c).
This is because the amount of rainfall is lower under the strict complements regime (region
34Although farmers use their reasonable good predictions in their decisions, we use actual future rainfall
in our estimation.
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a) relative to the weak substitutes regime (regions b and c). Rainfall is lower in region a)
(relative to regions b and c) due to weather seasonalities: the percentage of observations in
Apr-May (when the agricultural products need the water the most) is substantially higher in
region a) (strict complements) relative to regions b) and c) (weak substitutes). The opposite
is true during the low demand season (Jan-Mar and Oct-Dec). Finally, note that there is no
substantial variation (between the strict complement and weak substitutes regimes) in terms
of the percentage of observations by Schedule (day or night) and Weekday (Mo, Tu, We, Th,
and Fr).
5 Estimation Results, Counterfactuals, and Discussion
Estimation Results
In this section we present the estimation results under various econometric specifications.
We let private valuations for each four-units auction follow an exponential distribution, and
follow the described estimation procedure. As discussed above, the number of bidders, N ,
is determined by the monthly average of diﬀerent bidders who bought water in the sample
(years 1954 to 1966). In this 13-year sample, the average is slightly above 8. Each of these
farmers regularly won auctions. It is reasonable to assume that they attended the auctions.
Tables 5 and 6 present our estimation results. Columns 1, 3, and 5 present the estimates for
N = 8, whereas columns 2, 4, and 6 do it for N = 10. In their simulated Non Linear Least
Squares (NLLS) estimation, Laﬀont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) search for the best value of
N by minimizing a lack-of-fit criterion (proposition 4). Note that, as discussed in section 4,
identification of the distribution of valuations and structural parameters of our model requires
observation of the total number of bidders. The rationale for this is straightforward: whether
second highest realization of the random variable vi is from a sample of size N = 10, or from
a sample of size N = 100, it is crucial to interpret the second highest bid (observable in our
data). Although observation of an additional order statistic can eliminate this requirement
(Song 2004), this would require imposing further structure on the distribution of beliefs in
our model (to interpret auctions where, for example, three diﬀerent farmers win auctions),
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which is outside the scope of this investigation. Moreover, we observe only winning bids
in the data (see section 2). For each specification, we present the estimates of the model’s
structural parameters in Table 5 and the estimates of the covariates in Table 6. Table 6 is the
continuation of Table 5. That is, for each specification (column) in Table 5, Table 6 displays
the estimates of the covariates in that specification.
All parameters have the expected signs. We use the estimate of the parameter   (that
characterizes the distribution of private valuations), to compute the mean valuation of the
first complete unit of water. In the case of column 3, the value of the first complete unit
of water is 155.78 pesetas. As expected, in the specification in column 4 (with 10 diﬀerent
bidders), the mean value of the first complete unit of water is slightly lower, 135.20 pesetas.
The parameter  R1 , R 2 {C, S} captures the eﬀect of future rain. As farmers’ expectations
of future rain increase, DMR are more severe ( R1 > 0, R 2 {C, S}). This increases farmers’
likelihood of playing the strategies of a not-strict complements regime (see Table 4) and thus
reduces their valuation of subsequent units of water ( @p
i
t
@RFt
< 0). Predicted DMR are obtained
by adding the estimates of intercepts,  ˆR0 , R 2 {C, S}, to the estimates of the slope,  ˆR1 ,
R 2 {C, S}, conditional on the rain on the day of the auction. When evaluated at the average
future rain from each regime, the following null hypothesis (joint test) that overall DMR are
lower in the strict complements regime (as predicted by the model) cannot be rejected (p-
value above 10%). H0 :  ˆS0 +  ˆS1 Eˆs(RFt ) >  ˆC0 +  ˆC1 Eˆc(RFt ), where Eˆs(RFt ) = 1Ts
P
t:Dat=0
RFt ,
Eˆc(RFt ) = 1Tc
P
t:Dat=1
RFt , Ts, and Tc are the number of auctions in not-strict complements
and strict complements regimes, respectively.
The estimates of the SC parameter, ↵, are statistically significant in all specifications.
Given the choice of parametrization for sunk costs, the parameter estimates can be interpreted
as the percentage loss in terms of a complete unit of water (section 3). For our estimate in
column 3 this represents a loss of 4.75 pesetas (using the mean value of 155.78 pesetas for a
complete unit).
The estimated coeﬃcients for covariates have the expected sign. For specification 3,
for instance, prices in August (February) are significantly 234.08 pesetas higher (11.30 ptas
lower) than on January. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that water is more
(less) valuable during these months because of high (low) water demand. Also as expected,
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past rain decreases observed prices in the data. For specification in column 3, an increase in
the average rainfall by 1 mm from the previous week (with respect to the day of irrigation),
decreases average conditional price of a unit of water by 1.61 pesetas.
Participation cost are recovered using data where auctions were run with farmers present,
but no bids were placed, along with the identifying restriction that holds in such cases.35 Out
of the 3, 203 auctions where no bids were placed, we use the 2, 423 where some bidders where
present (auctions similar to the one in Figure 7). We obtain the following interval estimate
using specification 3: 0.0082 < cˆ < 0.1431. That is, participation costs are positive but small
(less than 14 cents of a peseta). This is in line with the intuition from the model: hassle or
opportunity costs because farmers value their time.
Counterfactuals
In this subsection we use the estimated model to compare the welfare under the three scenarios
described below: myopic farmers, large units, and paved channels. In each counterfactual
scenario we compare the welfare relative to the benchmark case in specification 3 from tables
5 and 6.
Welfare Scenarios
Myopic Farmers
In our setting we define a farmer as “myopic” if the farmer does not internalize the eﬀect of
the sunk cost (SC). A myopic farmer would “absorb” the SC, in that it would bid without
accounting for the resulting complementarity eﬀect. The myopic farmer, however, would still
be aﬀected by the SC. Thus, using the notation from our model, myopic farmers incorrectly
believe that ↵ = 0, and bid according to standard English auction model. Myopic farmers
correctly account for the decreasing marginal returns eﬀect (DMR).
To compute the counterfactual we use the estimated demand system—characterized by
the estimated private valuations and the model’s structural parameters—from specification 3
from tables 5 and 6, and simulate the bidding behavior assuming that farmers bid according
35See page 30.
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to a standard English auction model with ↵ = 0 and the estimated DMR eﬀect,  ˆ > 0 (from
specification 3 from tables 5 and 6). Then we compute the actual SC absorbed by the farmers
using the actual demand’s estimates (i.e. using the estimated distribution of valuations and
sunk cost, ↵ˆ, from specification 3 from tables 5 and 6). We use the actual setting (i.e. when
famers are not myopic and behave as observed in the data) as a benchmark and report the
eﬃciency gains/losses relative to this benchmark.
Large Units
We consider an alternative selling mechanism, whereby the cartel would sell “large units.”
We define these large units as a single ascending price English auction per four-units auction.
Thus, farmers are only able to bid for the large four-units auction (i.e. the right to use 12
hours of water for irrigation), not for the individual units (i.e. they cannot buy single units
with the right to use 3 hours of water for irrigation as in the benchmark case).
To compute the counterfactual we use the estimated demand system from section 5 and
simulate the bidding behavior assuming that farmers can bid only for large units. Again, we
use the actual setting (i.e. with non-myopic famers who can buy single units to use 3 hours
of water for irrigation) as a benchmark, and report the eﬃciency gains/losses relative to this
benchmark.
Paved Channels
Finally, we consider the counterfactual scenario, where the irrigation channels are paved. In
Mula the channels were pavemented in the 1970s(Gómez-Espín, Gil-Meseguer, and García-
Marín (2006)). Paved channels imply that farmers do not incur a SC for the first unit. Under
this counterfactual scenario farmers incur only DMR, not SC. Thus, ↵ = 0 and   > 0.
To compute the counterfactual we use the estimated demand system from section 5, and
simulate bidding behavior assuming that ↵ = 0 and   > 0. As in the previous cases, we use
the actual setting (i.e. with non-myopic famers, who can buy single units to use 3 hours of
water for irrigation, and where ↵ > 0 and   > 0) as a benchmark, and report the eﬃciency
gains/losses relative to this benchmark.
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Welfare Measures
We compute two sets of welfare measures:
Eﬃciency Gains/Losses per Unit. This measure represents the eﬃciency gain/loss per
unit (mean across units and farmers), and is measured in pesetas. We also report the standard
deviation, and the largest and smallest eﬃciency gain/loss.
Total Eﬃciency Gains/Losses. This measure represents the total eﬃciency gain/loss in
each counterfactual scenario. The total eﬃciency measure is the sum (across all units and
farmers) of the gains/losses per unit during the 13 years sample period in our data, and is
also measured pesetas.
For each set of welfare measures we report the eﬃciency gains/losses due to SC, DMR,
and the total. The latter is defined as the sum of the eﬃciency gains/losses due to SC plus
DMR.
Welfare Results
Table 7 reports the results from the counterfactual analysis. Myopic consumers incur sub-
stantial losses in terms of absorbing additional SC. They continue to buy the same (expected)
amount of water as in the benchmark scenario. But their bidding behavior ignores the com-
plementarity eﬀect caused by the SC. Each time they buy a unit, they incur an additional SC
and save the corresponding DMR, if they buy only one unit. Panel A shows that, on average,
there is a 28.56 pesetas eﬃciency loss per unit due to ignoring the presence of SC. Strong
seasonalities indicate that there is substantial heterogeneity in terms of the mean eﬃciency
loss per unit, with a minimum value of 6 cents and a maximum value of 60.63 pesetas. As
expected, not accounting for the SC generates savings in terms of the DMR because the
latter are incurred only when more than one unit is bought sequentially. Myopic farmers are
very unlikely to buy more than one unit. Panel B shows that the total eﬃciency loss due
to the farmers ignoring the presence of SC are substantial: 42, 497.36 pesetas during the 13
years sample period in our data. The savings resulting from incurring less DMR partially
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compensates for this loss. The total net loss due to myopic farmers is 1, 846.59 pesetas.
The second counterfactual scenario investigates an alternative selling mechanism, whereby
the cartel would only auction bundles of large four-units. Panels A and B show that this
mechanism would exacerbate the costs arising due to DMR. The mean lost due to DMR
is only 3.27 pesetas. This is because, in the benchmark, when farmers need the water the
most, they buy bundles of four-units (even when they can buy individual units) due to the
complementarity eﬀect generated by the SC. Again, there is substantial heterogeneity in
terms of the mean eﬃciency loss per unit due to seasonalities: the largest loss due to the
DMR is 615.29 pesetas per unit. As expected, large four-units bundles generate SC savings
that are relatively small (on average 20 cents per unit). Panel B shows that the counterfactual
selling mechanism of large units would generate a net total eﬃciency loss of 4, 563.74 pesetas
during the 13 years sample period in our data.
The final counterfactual scenario shows what happened in Mula in the 1970s, when the
channels were paved. Paved channels imply that farmers do not incur a SC for the first unit.
This results in a mean eﬃciency gain of 12.91 pesetas per unit relative to the benchmark
scenario, as reported in Panel A. Farmers continue to incur the DMR and internalize them;
thus there is no change in eﬃciency due to the DMR. The total net eﬃciency gain due to
paved channels is large: 19.208.09 pesetas during the 13 years sample period in our data, as
reported in Panel B.
Discussion
Robustness and Goodness of the Fit. In comparing columns 1-2 and 3-4, it is clear
that the model with covariates outperforms the model without, as shown by the significance
of past rain and seasonal dummy estimates, the increase in the likelihood function, and the
improvement in the goodness of the fit. The main reason is the dependence of prices on sea-
sonal factors, which we capture in our specification with seasonal dummy variables. From the
residual analysis we find no evidence that the increase in the log likelihood function is due to
the parametric misspecification of the value distribution itself. Our specification survives the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, so that the exponential distribution of private valuations cannot
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be rejected (for the specification in column 3 the p-value of the test is 41%).36
As regards the goodness-of-fit, our specification in column 3 performs quite well. The
pseudo R2 = 58% is obtained by computing predicted prices by our model: pseudo R2 =
1  
PT
t=1(pt pˆt)2PT
t=1(pt p¯)2
, where pˆt are prices predicted by the model and p¯ is the mean of prices.
These results are in line with the R2 obtained in the reduced-form regressions. Although
not directly comparable given the distribution assumptions in the structural approach, the
R2 = 23% in the reduced-form specification with all covariates (column 3 in Table 2) can be
heuristically interpreted as the proportion of variability in the data set that is accounted for
by the covariates. The proportion accounted for by the model without covariates displayed in
column 1 in Table 5 is R2 = 32%.37 As can be seen in Figure 8, our model allows us to follow
winning prices accurately.38 The figure displays real prices against predicted prices using
three diﬀerent models: (i) our structural model (specification 3 in Table 5), (ii) a standard
English auction model (specification 5 in Table 5, that we discuss in the next subsection),
and (iii) a reduced-form model (specification 4 from Table 2 that includes as regressors Past
Rain and multiple fixed eﬀects, including individual fixed eﬀects).
Understanding the Importance of the Model. We proceed now to analyze our model’s
implications with respect to the importance of SC and DMR. Suppose that the researcher
neglects the dynamics that arise from the model and, instead, estimates a standard English
auction model. Suppose, for instance, that we are in the strict complements regime and
that valuations follow a distribution with mean, µv, and standard deviation,  v. Then, the
estimated mean of the distribution of valuations using the standard model will be underesti-
mated: ˆE (vi)
SM
< E (vi) = µv, where SM stands for standard model. Similarly, the estima-
tion of the standard deviation of valuations will be overestimated: ˆV (vi)
SM
> V (vi) =  v.39
The same is true in the weak substitutes case.
36We perform the nonparametric test to evaluate the equality of two distributions of valuations: our sample
of private values with a reference from an exponential distribution.
37If we additionally add individual fixed eﬀects to the reduced-form specification, the R2 just increases
from 23% to 36% (column 4 in Table 2).
38We describe how we compute the predicted prices in section D in the online appendix. See also section
D in the online appendix for a high definition version of this figure.
39In the strict complements case, and given a fixed number of potential bidders N , the (true) mean and
variance of the N   1 order statistic will be greater than the estimated using the standard model because
the (true) price paid will be [4  ↵  6 t,c] vN 1:N   4c and not 4vN 1:N (predicted by the standard model).
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Overestimation of the variance of the distribution is caused by attributing the variation
in prices (among diﬀerent units) to a relatively more dispersed underlying distribution. The
farmer actually pays for the whole bundle in the first unit, thus deterring the entrance of other
bidders in the remaining three auctions. The mean is underestimated when the common SC
and DMR are not accounted for in the estimation. In the case of the exponential distribution
used in our specifications, this failure translates into an underestimation of the parameter µ.
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 5 present the estimates from a standard English (button)
auction. Aside from the mentioned bias in the parameter that characterizes the distribution,
the results in these columns indicate that taking SC and DMR into account significantly
contributes to the model’s explanatory power. Figure 8 shows predicted prices from the
standard (button) English auction model (specification 5 in Table 5), and compares them
with actual prices and with those from our structural model (specification 3 in Table 5).40
Consistent with these results, the p-value for the null hypothesis that ↵ˆ =  ˆC0 =  ˆS0 =  ˆC1 =
 ˆS1 = cˆ = 0 is less than 10 4.
An alternative approach is to ask how the incomplete model from Haile and Tamer (2003)
can be adapted to the present case.41 This alternative approach relies on two basic assump-
tions with intuitive appeal: (i) bidders do not bid more than they are willing to pay for a
unit, and (ii) bidders do not allow an opponent to win at a price they are willing to beat.
In our case, with SC and DMR, these two simple assumptions are violated. In the strict
complements regime, bidders bid according to b1i (vi) = [4  ↵  6 ] vi   4c > vi, violating
(i), and no bidder (except the highest type) participates in the second to fourth unit auc-
tions, violating (ii). In the non weak substitutes regime, both assumptions are also violated,
though the intuition is diﬀerent. In this case, the equilibrium is only partially revealing:
bidders’ strategies are step functions, so the equilibrium is semi-pooling. When ↵ is greater
but close to  , bidders bid above their valuations to intimidate other bidders and deter entry
in the second auction, thus (i) is violated. Additionally, the same argument as in Black and
De Meza (1992) and Liu (2011) applies when goods are substitutes. The winner of the first
40See footnote 38.
41Larsen (2013) uses a similar approach to Haile and Tamer to obtain bounds about the primitives in an
auction model followed by dynamic bargaining with two-sided incomplete information without solving for
the equilibrium of the game.
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auction imposes a negative externality on himself. His willingness to pay for the second unit
is lower than it was for the first unit, making him a weaker bidder in such situations. Given
that all bidders will internalize this eﬀect, some will bid below their marginal utility for the
object in the first auction. The greater are DMR,  , the greater this underbidding eﬀect will
be.
Applying these assumptions to the four-units bundle would not to produce informative
bounds because marginal valuations of the units diﬀer according to the regime and the
number of diﬀerent winners per four-units auction. Bundling the four-units or even applying
Haile and Tamer’s approach separately for each regime, requires the model in section 3 as an
interpretation of the underlying behavior.42
Complementarities are not Collusion. An alternative hypothesis of farmers’ behav-
ior in the strict complements regime is that bidders might be playing some collusive (non-
competitive) strategy. As emphasized in section 2, the demand side of this market for water
is composed of as many as hundreds of farmers (Table 3). Even when farmers attend the
auction and do not bid, the observed number of diﬀerent winners is relatively high (Figure
7). (Note that all auctions were run in weeks similar to the one in Figure 7, so water for
units 17-20 was available in the dam to sell.) Farmers compete for water that will ultimately
determine the quality and quantity of their crop, and in some cases, even the survival of their
trees (for example, in drought years). It is unlikely that farmers can make credible collusive
commitments in such a situation. Contemporaries emphasized the opposite situation: farm-
ers competed aggressively for water, especially during droughts, although water owners were
reluctant to lower the price of the water to meet the needs of the poorest farmers.43
The high number of non-collusive auctions provides evidence farmers did not collude.
Farmers met every week, hence the discount rate from one week to the next one was close to
1. If we focus on two consecutive four-units auctions, the discount rate is virtually 1. Thus,
any collusive agreement would be easy to sustain and we would observe no “price-wars”, or
deviations from collusive strategies. If the collusion hypothesis were true, all auctions would
42Note also that failure to consider the eﬀect of the structural parameters (SC and DMR) explicitly intro-
duces diﬃculties.
43These opinions, along with a qualitative analysis can be found in Vera Nicolás (2004).
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look collusive except, perhaps, during certain periods where we would observe price-wars.
We observe in many cases, however, that both regimes are present during the same week.
Unlike Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997) this is not a formal test.44
Nevertheless, taking the analysis one step further, if the collusion hypothesis were true, we
would expect more collusion in autumn-winter and less collusion in spring-summer. Incentives
to deviate from the collusion strategy are higher in spring-summer because the value of the
water is higher due to seasonalities (Figures 2 and Panel A in Figure 3). Punishment is
about the same in any season. The maximum punishment would be to play the competitive
equilibrium forever. Future discounted earnings in this case are similar in summer and in
winter. Hence, deviating from the collusive strategy is more profitable in summer than in
winter. However, the data show the opposite pattern. Figure 9 displays the distribution of
auctions in the complementarities regime by month. Complementarities are more likely to be
observed in summer than in winter, when water requirements (and hence equilibrium prices)
soar. This is in line with our interpretation according to the model with sunk and entry
costs.
A “competitive” collusion? We have implicitly assumed that farmers’ plots were spaced
suﬃciently far apart from each other. Specifically, we assumed that no other farmer could
use the same sub-channel just used by his neighbor. In reality, this assumption is not true
for all cases. Because the cost of watering the sub-channel is sunk, if the plots of two farmers
are located next to each other and they share the same sub-channel, then one farmer could
free-ride and outbid the first winner in the second auction. Knowing this, the first winner
would bid lower in the first auction. This situation would reduce the revenue of the auction
and create ineﬃciencies. Because farmers might not internalize this free-riding eﬀect, they
would take into account the equilibrium outcome for the remaining auctions, and lower their
bid in the first auction. They would then will try to outbid their neighbors in later auctions.
In a situation such as this, it would be relatively easy to sustain a collusive agreement
among neighboring farmers. The number of members of the coalition would be small (say,
44Collusion in repeated auctions has been analyzed conditional (Hopenhayn and Skrzypacz 2004) and
unconditional (Porter and Zona 1999 and Pesendorfer 2000) on the history of the game. A discussion on how
to detect collusion can be found in Porter (2005).
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three or four farmers), and because they are neighbors, they would know each other well
and might even share animals or machinery for agricultural purposes. Each farmer in the
coalition would compete in the auction for the first unit, but would not enter the remaining
auctions if one member of the coalition won the first unit. With this agreement they would
achieve eﬃciency by solving the free riding problem. With the resulting increase in eﬃciency,
the revenue of the auction would also increase, and the auctioneer would not be opposed to
the “collusion.” This situation would not aﬀect our results unless farmers coordinated bidding
rings to not outbid neighboring farmers in the first auction. It will aﬀect only the outcome
when both the bidder with the highest valuation and the bidder with the second highest
valuation belong to the same ring, but the bidder with the third highest valuation belongs to
a diﬀerent ring. In this case, our model predicts that the observed price is the valuation of
the second highest bidder, but it actually corresponds to the valuation of the third highest
bidder. This is unlikely in our empirical setting because the nearly 500 farmers would form
around 150 rings (based on the geographical locations that we obtained from the census
data). The probability that the two bidders with the highest valuation belong to the same
ring is virtually zero. Moreover, the diﬀerence between the second highest and the third
highest valuation will be small in any case. 45
Eﬃciency. The model displayed in section 3 assumes that it is costly for the bidders to
enter the auction. In order to compare the sequential ascending price auction with other
mechanisms, this entry cost has to be taken into account. In this context, and following
Stegeman (1996), we interpret entry cost as the cost farmers incur when they send a message
to the auctioneer, or to some other farmers. Here, the notions of ex-ante and ex-post eﬃciency
are no longer equivalent. Although it may be ex-ante eﬃcient that more than one player
sends a message, it is always ex-post eﬃcient that at most one player sends a message.
For this case, where it is costly to send messages to the planner, Stegeman (1996) shows
that the ascending price auction has an equilibrium that is ex-ante eﬃcient. In contrast,
the first-price auction may have no eﬃcient equilibrium, and the author considers only the
45There is an extensive literature on the theory of bidding cartels (e.g. Graham and Marshall 1987;
Hendricks, Porter, and Guofu (2008); Hopenhayn and Skrzypacz 2004; and McAfee and McMillan 1992). For
English auctions, Asker 2010 empirically investigates a bidding cartel of collectable stamps. See Harrington
2008 for a survey.
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single-unit case. In our sequential unit case, we have shown that when goods are strict
complements the analysis is identical to the single unit case. Hence, the result applies here
as well. However, when goods are weak substitutes, the result applies only to the last auction.
Although outside the scope of this article, further work to investigate whether a sequential
ascending price auction is ex-post eﬃcient when the planner has to allocate several objects
to players that face SC, DMR, and costly messages, would be a useful extension.
6 Conclusions
By aﬀecting bidders’ behavior in sequential auctions, sunk costs and decreasing marginal
returns (DMR) in the presence of participation costs generate very diﬀerent price dynamics
within the same market. This diﬀerence in price dynamics is attributable to the varying
extent to which the value of sequential goods complements or falls relative to previous units.
The deterrence eﬀect, whereby the same bidder pays a high price for the first unit (deterring
others from entering subsequent auctions), and a low price for the remaining units, arises
when sunk costs are relatively high compared to the DMR, thus creating complementarities
among the goods. Substitutability arises due to decreasing returns when sunk costs are
relatively small. In this case, equilibrium prices are similar in magnitude, regardless of
whether the same or diﬀerent bidders win the objects. Careful consideration of these features
is fundamental to demand characterization, a cornerstone of many positive and normative
questions in economics.
Using a novel data set from a decentralized market institution that operated privately for
eight centuries in southern Spain, we document these price dynamics and develop a model
to recover the underlying structural parameters and distribution of valuations. Although
the bidders are better informed than the sellers in our model, the latter know that the se-
quential English auction allocates water (ex-ante) eﬃciently. Not requiring farmers to reveal
their marginal valuations is an advantage of the mechanism, whose simplicity reduces costs
associated with its implementation and helps explain its stability. We address three main
questions. Are water units complements or substitutes, and why? Is the deterrence eﬀect
consistent with a competitive market structure or a consequence of collusive behavior among
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farmers? What would happen to the estimates in this setting if the researcher, by ignoring
the importance of participation and sunk costs, failed to account for the complementarity
feature of the sequential goods?
First we document that during the period under study both complementarities and sub-
stitutabilities are observed in the data, generating diﬀerent price dynamics. Seasonality,
related to the water requirements of the crops and the expected rainfall, aﬀects the relative
importance of sunk costs and decreasing returns, causing bidders to behave accordingly in
these regimes. Second, the apparent collusive behavior, when the same bidder wins all the
goods, paying very low prices for all the units following the first unit, is actually competitive
(or non-cooperative). Contrary to the collusion hypothesis, this behavior is caused by com-
plementarities, and is observed when the value of water (as well as the average price paid
per unit and, thus, the incentive to deviate from a collusion strategy) increases relative to
the standard competitive pattern registered in the weak substitutes regime. This shows the
importance of interpreting the data through the economic model. Finally, by estimating our
model, we confirm the relevance of participation and sunk costs in our empirical environ-
ment. By testing the performance of our model relative to a standard English auction model
without participation costs, we confirm that estimations using the latter are not accurate.
Aside from the bias generated by ignoring sunk costs and decreasing returns, price dynamics
play an important role, as it is not appropriate to attribute the variation in prices among
sequential units (when the goods are complements) to a relatively more disperse underlying
distribution of valuations.
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Figure 1: Auction Samples.
Panel A: Goods Are Substitutes.
Auction # Name Price Day
1 Pedro Fernández 123
Mo2 Pedro Fernández 1113 Pedro Fernández 111
4 Pedro Fernández 109
5 Pedro Blaya 115
Tu6 Jose Ruiz 1167 Mauricio Gutiérrez 117
8 Mauricio Gutiérrez 106
9 Ambrosio Ortíz 116
We10 Ambrosio Ortíz 10011 Ambrosio Ortíz 100
12 Carlota Pomares 116
13 Eliseo Gutiérrez 120
Th14 Antonio Muñoz 11215 Antonio Navarro 110
16 Vicente Ledesma 106
17 Jose Gálvez 103
Fr18 Juan Martínez 9119 Juan Martínez 90
20 Jesus Gutiérrez 100
Panel B: Goods are Complements.
Auction # Name Price Day
1 Juana Fernández 1580
Mo2 Juana Fernández 503 Juana Fernández 50
4 Juana Fernández 50
5 Francisco Gabarrón 1401
Tu6 Francisco Gabarrón 507 Francisco Gabarrón 50
8 Francisco Gabarrón 50
9 Jose Fernández 1401
We10 Jose Fernández 2511 Jose Fernández 25
12 Jose Fernández 25
13 Antonio Belijar Boluda 1401
Th14 Antonio Belijar Boluda 2515 Antonio Belijar Boluda 25
16 Antonio Belijar Boluda 25
17 Manuel Gutiérrez 1406
Fr18 Manuel Gutiérrez 5019 Manuel Gutiérrez 50
20 Manuel Gutiérrez 50
Notes: Units 1 to 4 are the units bought on Monday (Mo) during day (unit 1 corresponds to right to irrigate from 7AM to
10AM, unit 2 from 10AM to 1PM, unit 3 from 1PM to 4PM, and unit 4 from 4PM to 7PM). Similarly, units 5 to 8 are the units
bought on Tuesday (Tu) during day; units 9 to 12 are the units on Wednesday (We) during day; units 13 to 16 are the units
on Thursday (Th) during day; and units 17 to 20 are the units on Friday (Fr) during day. Panel A: Sample from original data
obtained from the historical archive: Goods Are Substitutes (Winter - February 18, 1955, Day). Panel B: Sample from original
data obtained from the historical archive: Goods Are Complements (Summer - July 22, 1966, Day).
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Figure 2: Rain and Frequency Distribution of 4CU Over the Sample Period
Notes: The figure displays for each month: i) the number of auctions where the same farmer wins all four consecutive units, and
ii) total rain using a Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression (of ’total rain’ on ’month of the year’) with an Epanechnikov kernel
with bandwidth selected by cross validation.
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Figure 3: Winning Prices: by Number of Consecutive Units Bought by the Same Farmer and
by Unit
Notes: The figure displays price variation from the raw data (for the whole sample) disaggregated by:
i) Top Panel: Number of consecutive units won by the same farmer (1, 2, 3, and 4; note that we called them 1CU, 2CU, 3CU,
and 4CU in Tables A1 in the online and appendix and in table1).
ii) Bottom Panel: further disaggregating each vertical box from the Top Panel by unit (First Unit, Second Unit, Third unit,
and Fourth unit). Note that 1, 2, 3, and 4 indicate the number of consecutive units won by the same farmer (same as in the
graph in the top).
Each vertical box (unit) displays the maximum price (upper adjacent value), 75th percentile (upper hinge), median (black circle
marker), 25th percentile (lower hinge), and minimum price (lower adjacent value).
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Figure 4: Winning Prices: by Weekday, Hour and Schedule
Notes: The figure displays the distribution of winning prices by: i) Unit (First Unit in Blue, Second Unit in Red, Third Unit
in Green, and Fourth Unit in Orange); Weekday (Mo=Monday, Tu=Tuesday, We=Wednesday, Th=Thursday, and Fr=Friday);
and Schedule (Day=Day-Time and Night=Night-Time). Thus, the figure displays the distribution of prices of each of the 40
units auctioned per week for the whole sample (disaggregated by Unit, Weekday, and Schedule). Each vertical box (unit) displays
the maximum price (upper adjacent value), 75th percentile (upper hinge), median (black circle marker), 25th percentile (lower
hinge), and minimum price (lower adjacent value).
Figure 5: Winning Prices: by Season and Drought
Notes: The figure displays the distribution of winning prices by: i) Season and Drought Indicator. Each vertical box displays
the maximum price (upper adjacent value), 75th percentile (upper hinge), median, 25th percentile (lower hinge), and minimum
price (lower adjacent value). We define a drought as an indicator that equals one when average monthly rain during the specific
year is below a consensus threshold defined in the literature in terms of the historic annual average (following Gil Olcina 1994
we use a threshold of 40%). The numbers below each box correspond to the percentage (in terms of the whole sample) of
observations in each box (i.e. al these numbers sum up to 100%).
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Figure 6: The Channel System in Mula and the Sunk Cost of Initiating the Irrigation
Notes: The main canal (left panel) was made of concrete. The individual sub-channels (right panel) were dug into the ground.
Thus, in these sub-channels, a water loss is incurred because water flows over a dry sub-channel (some water is absorbed by the
ground).
Figure 7: Auction Sample: Auction where Farmers Are Present and No Bids Are Placed
Auction # Name Price Day
1 Sebastian Aguilar 48
Mo2 Felipe Amaro 423 Felipe Amaro 48
4 Diego Guirao 50
5 Felipe Amaro 54
Tu6 Antonio Llamas 517 Cristóbal Romero 47
8 Cristóbal Romero 50
9 Cristóbal Gutiérrez 2
We10 Cristóbal Gutiérrez 511 Cristóbal Gutiérrez 1
12 Cristóbal Gutiérrez 1
13 Luis Moya 2.75
Th14 Luis Moya 115 Luis Moya 1
16 Luis Moya 1
17
Fr1819
20
Notes: Sample from original data obtained from the historical archive: Auction where farmers are present and no bids are placed
(Winter - January 22, 1954, Day).
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Figure 8: Winning and Estimated Prices
Notes: The figure displays real prices against predicted prices using three diﬀerent models: (i) our structural model (specification
3 in Table 5), (ii) a standard (button) English auction model (specification 5 in Table 5), and (iii) a reduced-form model for the
sample using as regressors: Past Rain, unit (3 dummy variables), weekday (4 dummy variables), schedule (1 dummy variable),
month (11 dummy variables), year (12 dummy variables), and individual fixed eﬀects, in addition to a constant (for details
about the reduced-form specification see Table 2 discussed in section 2). The graph shows the mean monthly averages of the
prices. Similar results are obtained using a spline (available in our earlier working article Donna and Espin-Sanchez 2012). See
section D in the online appendix for a high definition version of this figure.
Figure 9: Regime Frequency Disaggregation by Month
Notes: The figure depicts the frequency of auctions where the same farmer buys all four consecutive units (4CU), by regime (see
section 2) and month. (Note that the sum of 4CU over months and regimes—the vertical lines in the graph—is equal to 1470 =
5880/4. See Table 1 in the article and Table A1 in the online appendix.) It can be seen that complementarities are more likely
to be observed in summer than in winter, where water requirements (and, hence, equilibrium prices) soar. We interpret this as
evidence in favor of the competition hypothesis (according to our model with entry and sunk costs) and against the collusion
hypothesis.
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Table 1: Distribution of Winning Prices: by Number of CU and Sequential Auction
Panel 1: Price distribution by number of consecutive winning bids: All Auctions
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 101 218.2 327.9 3000 0.05 3530
2CU 123 256.7 364.6 2700 0.05 2866
3CU 190 320.0 415.5 4050 0.05 1716
4CU 182 339.9 470.2 4830 0.05 5880
Panel 2: Price distribution by number of consecutive winning bids: First Auction
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 100 211.1 304.1 2921 0.05 977
2CU 150 305.0 427.8 2700 0.05 673
3CU 220.5 410.0 512.5 4050 0.05 382
4CU 451 677.6 689.5 4830 0.05 1470
Panel 3: Price distribution by number of consecutive winning bids: Second Auction
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 93.25 219.8 373.0 3000 0.10 624
2CU 103.5 230.2 328.0 2685 0.05 867
3CU 181 294.9 364.7 2850 0.05 539
4CU 101 242.7 309.3 2605 0.05 1470
Panel 4: Price distribution by number of consecutive winning bids: Third Auction
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 94 200.8 312.3 2357 0.10 715
2CU 126.5 256.5 353.9 2601 0.10 778
3CU 151.5 285.55 379.0 2801 0.05 536
4CU 100 229.2 294.2 2701 0.05 1470
Panel 5: Price distribution by number of consecutive winning bids: Fourth Auction
Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1CU 114.5 233.4 330.2 2601 0.05 1214
2CU 113.5 239.6 344.8 2601 0.10 548
3CU 167 311.6 411.6 2630 0.05 259
4CU 100 210.1 272.6 2935 0.05 1470
Panel 6: Price distribution for 4CU
Auction Median Mean SD Max Min Obs
1st to 4th 182 339.9 470.2 4830 0.05 5880
1st 451 677.6 689.5 4830 0.05 1470
2nd 101 242.7 309.3 2605 0.05 1470
3rd 100 229.2 294.2 2701 0.05 1470
4th 100 210.1 272.6 2935 0.05 1470
1st and 2nd 253 460.2 576.9 4830 0.05 2940
2nd and 3rd 101.0 235.9 301.9 3001 0.05 2940
3rd and 4th 100.0 219.7 283.7 2935 0.05 2940
1st to 3rd 200.0 383.2 512.4 4830 0.05 4410
2nd to 4th 100.0 227.3 292.7 3001 0.05 4410
Notes: The table displays the Distribution of Winning Prices. Panels 1 to 5 presents the Distribution of Prices disaggregated
by cases where the same farmer buys one, two, three, or four consecutive units (1CU, 2CU, 3CU, or 4CU, respectively). Panel
1 presents the Distribution of Prices for All Auctions (i.e. First, Second, Third, and Fourth Auctions). Panel 2 presents the
Distribution of Prices for First Auctions. Panel 3 presents the Distribution of Prices for Second Auctions. Panel 4 presents
the Distribution of Prices for Third Auctions. Panel 5 presents the Distribution of Prices for Fourth Auctions. Finally, Panel
6 presents Distribution of Prices just for 4CU (i.e. for the subsample of 5880 auctions where the same farmer won all four
consecutive units). Note that the first line in Panel 6 (1st to 4th) displays the same information as the last line in Panel 1
(4CU). The second line in Panel 6 (1st) displays the same information as the last line in Panel 2 (4CU). The third line in Panel
6 (2nd) displays the same information as the last line in Panel 3 (4CU). The fourth line in Panel 6 (3rd) displays the same
information as the last line in Panel 4 (4CU). The fifth line in Panel 6 (4th) displays the same information as the last line in
Panel 5 (4CU).
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Table 2: Correlation Between Winning Prices and Covariates
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Rain MA7 -4.054*** -4.112*** -2.991*** -3.174***
(0.674) (0.689) (0.558) (0.623)
Rain Day Bought -0.235 -0.185 0.052 0.178
(0.143) (0.142) (0.156) (0.153)
Unit 2 Day -167.95*** -167.82*** -180.61***
(19.47) (19.45) (21.89)
Unit 3 Day -173.03*** -172.91*** -188.05***
(19.93) (19.92) (22.75)
Unit 4 Day -176.54*** -176.54*** -190.83***
(20.44) (20.44) (23.10)
Unit 2 Night -237.58*** -237.86*** -249.33***
(24.90) (24.94) (27.35)
Unit 3 Night -243.32*** -243.52*** -257.65***
(25.45) (25.49) (28.31)
Unit 4 Night -254.84*** -255.19*** -266.41***
(25.73) (25.78) (28.91)
Tuesday 26.02*** 32.19*** 10.06
(7.49) (8.24) (12.48)
Wednesday -34.58*** -29.39** -31.73**
(10.63) (11.97) (15.47)
Thursday -59.65*** -55.41*** -42.92***
(10.77) (12.35) (15.04)
Friday -94.95*** -95.54*** -76.37***
(12.71) (14.50) (17.29)
Night -110.09*** -111.04*** -102.68***
(11.36) (10.95) (13.43)
Unit FE No Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE No Yes Yes Yes
Schedule FE No Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No No Yes Yes
Individual FE No No No Yes
R2 0.016 0.083 0.230 0.359
Observations 13,801 13,801 13,801 13,801
Notes: All columns are OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the winning price in each auction (one cuarta). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. FE stands for Fixed Eﬀects. Individual FE refers to a set of dummy variables identifying diﬀerent winners
(names) in our sample. We obtain similar results including Week FE (a set of dummy variables identifying 52 or 53 weeks of
the corresponding year). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample restricted to auctions with positive bids during the period
January 1954 to August 1966.
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Table 3: Timing Structure of Diﬀerent Winners: Estimation Sample
Month 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 Total
1 4 6 0 3 1 11 3 0 0 0 28 0 11 61
2 4 4 0 2 4 2 3 0 0 0 19 0 21 57
3 5 3 0 9 0 1 2 0 0 10 29 8 23 79
4 0 2 0 6 2 5 4 6 0 17 28 38 28 121
5 5 7 0 6 1 13 9 6 9 4 32 30 31 130
6 3 7 0 7 0 8 10 7 10 14 23 25 29 119
7 2 3 0 6 9 26 8 5 13 15 17 21 23 117
8 9 3 0 3 4 10 7 14 18 15 21 16 3 102
9 8 8 0 3 8 10 5 13 0 8 35 19 0 97
10 8 7 3 2 11 2 0 9 0 10 16 19 0 78
11 7 2 3 0 8 2 0 4 0 21 29 23 0 82
12 1 0 2 2 3 1 0 0 0 36 18 12 0 69
Total 48 43 8 43 48 80 47 54 44 106 179 147 128 537
Notes: Total, in the last row, refers to the total number of diﬀerent winners for the specific year (column). Given that, within
a year, the same bidders win multiple units in several months, this number is below the sum over months, by year. Similarly for
the last column, where Total is the number of diﬀerent bidders for the specific month (row) during the 13-year sample. Finally,
537, refers to the total number of diﬀerent bidders in the whole sample. The monthly average of diﬀerent bidders who bought
water in the sample (years 1954 to 1966) is 8.31.
Table 4: Rain Expectations and Regime Coordination
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Future Rain -1.6e-03*** -1.5e-03*** -1.6e-03***
(0.5e-03) (0.5e-03) (0.6e-03)
Weekday FE NO YES YES
Schedule FE NO YES YES
Month FE NO NO YES
Notes: Sample restricted to the one used in the structural estimation in Table 5. Almost identical results are obtained using the
whole sample. All specifications are probit regressions. Marginal eﬀects are reported. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the regime is strict complements. Future Rain is a moving average
of rain in Mula for seven days after the corresponding date of the auction (Future Rain is a proxy variable for farmers’ rain
expectations for the day where they are buying water). Past Rain (a moving average of rain in Mula for seven days before the
corresponding date of the auction) and Actual Rain (the amount of rain in Mula in the day of the auction) are not statistically
significant in any of the above regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Structural Estimation
Structural parameters
Specifications
Sequential Auction Model Standard Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Valuation [ ˆE(V )] 150.343 130.012 155.782 135.201 166.991 142.863(12.814) (11.047) (17.608) (14.674) (87.420) (81.089)
Sunk Cost (↵ˆ) 0.030 0.0301 0.031 0.032(6.9e-03) (7.6e-04) (2.1e-03) (4.9e-03)
 ˆc0
1.03e-02 1.01e-02 1.01e-02 1.02e-02
(2.6e-05) (7.3e-05) (5.0e-03) (7.4e-04)
 ˆs0 1.00e-02 1.02e-02 1.03e-02 1.49e-02
(0.0036) (0.0019) (4.3e-03) (1.5e-03)
Future Rain
 ˆc1 -2.41e-14 -2.23e-17 -1.73e-12 1.82e-14
(7.1e-02) (3.4e-03) (8.0e-10) (3.29e-10)
 ˆs1 0.213 0.1828 0.2128 0.1828
(0.003) (0.004) (0.017) (0.079)
Mean ⇢ˆ
- Strict Complements 0.239 0.205 0.237 0.219
- Weak Substitutes -0.332 -0.286 -0.322 -0.286
N 8 10 8 10 8 10
Past Rain Polynomial No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schedule Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday Dummy Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Dummy Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.324 0.316 0.576 0.571 0.142 0.133
Log likelihood -12,206 -13,068 -10,755 -11,298 -50,931 -54,957
# of Auctions 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors (with B = 1, 000 bootstrap repetitions) are reported in parenthesis (for the Mean Valuation
it corresponds to the bootstrapped standard error corresponding to Z0t ). Estimates in columns 1 to 4 (sequential auction model)
are obtained using the estimation procedure described in section 4 (see sections E and F in the online appendix for details).
For the distribution of private values and inclusion of covariates, we use an exponential distribution. Estimates in specifications
5 and 6 (standard model) are MLE obtained by maximizing the likelihood function from a standard English auction model
allowing the mean of the distribution of valuations depend on the same characteristics as in the other specifications as indicated
in equation 7, without fixed costs nor decreasing marginal returns (the sample is the same as the one in columns 1 to 4, including
in this case all sequential prices in the estimation). Number of years in the sample is 13. Number of months in the sample is
119. The number of diﬀerent winners (across all 13 years) is 537. The complementarity parameter, ⇢, is computed as detailed
in the in section 3. When the goods are strict complements is given by ⇢Ct =
↵ 3 Ct
1 ↵ =
↵ 3( C0 + C1 RFt )
1 ↵ . The table reports, for
each specification of the sequential auction model in columns 1 to 4: ˆ¯⇢C =
↵ˆ 3
⇣
 ˆC0 + ˆ
C
1
1
T (
PT
t=1Da,tR
F
t )
⌘
1 ↵ˆ . Similarly, when the
goods are weak substitutes, the table reports, for each specification: ˆ¯⇢S =
↵ˆ 3
⇣
 ˆS0 + ˆ
S
1
1
T (
PT
t=1(Db,tR
F
t +Dc,tR
F
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⌘
1 ↵ˆ .
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Table 6: Structural Estimation (continued)
Structural parameters
Specifications
Sequential Auction Model Standard Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Covariates
Past Rain ( ˆ1)
-1.615 -1.415 -1.426 -1.227
(0.238) (0.605) (0.436) (0.334)
(Past Rain)2 ( ˆ2)
0.007 0.006 0.004 0.003
(0.018) (0.041) (0.177) (0.353)
Night ( ˆ3)
-24.835 -22.3778 -30.014 -26.115
(6.719) (8.793) (2.192) (4.956)
Tuesday ( ˆ4)
-1.416 -1.070 -2.642 -2.539
(0.574) (7.615) (1.519) (1.909)
Wednesday ( ˆ5)
-2.228 -1.867 -5.858 -5.203
(0.282) (0.708) (2.431) (8.280)
Thursday ( ˆ6)
-12.225 -10.437 -15.645 -13.584
(0.623) (0.710) (5.330) (6.755)
Friday ( ˆ7)
-18.562 -15.679 -28.025 -24.461
(7.610) (7.723) (11.27) (1.979)
Feb. ( ˆ8)
-11.304 -10.846 -4.955 -4.587
(31.036) (25.299) (2.529) (4.851)
Mar. ( ˆ9)
25.717 22.328 34.976 30.358
(12.459) (8.809) (9.847) (7.257)
Apr. ( ˆ8)
74.336 64.410 79.014 67.498
(20.376) (13.843) (21.234) (30.691)
May. ( ˆ10)
122.740 106.571 114.391 96.805
(20.835) (41.612) (46.658) (26.490)
Jun. ( ˆ11)
59.182 51.351 57.539 48.619
(16.416) (10.303) (7.277) (13.711)
Jul. ( ˆ12)
205.034 178.187 225.191 191.960
(48.903) (17.205) (39.410) (32.087)
Aug. ( ˆ13)
234.08 202.33 247.37 209.96
(25.007) (36.652) (74.393) (76.830)
Sep. ( ˆ14)
77.844 62.152 87.986 75.459
(30.352) (27.768) (39.766) (16.519)
Oct. ( ˆ15)
78.009 66.774 80.636 70.440
(28.334) (30.935) (30.903) (26.283)
Nov. ( ˆ16)
6.115 4.937 13.049 11.044
(2.410) (1.122) (4.605) (6.827)
Dec. ( ˆ17)
1.855 1.404 2.817 2.493
(1.734) (2.565) (2.296) (2.678)
Intercept ( ˆ0)
150.343 130.012 90.994 79.948 101.771 87.825
(12.814) (11.047) (23.757) (31.541) (54.609) (82.320)
N 8 10 8 10 8 10
Past Rain Polynomial No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Schedule Dummy No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday Dummy Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Dummy Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.324 0.316 0.576 0.571 0.142 0.133
Log likelihood -12,206 -13,068 -10,755 -11,298 -50,931 -54,957
# of Auctions 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952 5,952
Notes: See notes in Table 5.
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Table 7: Counterfactuals
Panel A: Eﬃciency gains/losses per unit relative to the benchmark
Myopic Large Paved
Farmers Units Channels
(1) (2) (3)
Sunk Costs -28.56 0.20 12.91
(14.97) (1.37) (6.82)
[-60.63, -0.06] [0,15.49] [0.02,39.97]
Deacreasing 27.31 -3.27 0
Marginal Returns (27.71) (33.99) -
[0.05,479.22] [-615.29,0] -
Total -1.25 -3.06 12.91
(35.72) (24.12) (6.82)
[-60.63,479.22] [-615.29, 15.49] [0,39.97]
Panel B: Total eﬃciency gains/losses relative to the benchmark
Myopic Large Paved
Farmers Units Channels
(1) (2) (3)
Sunk Costs -42,497.36 303.94 19,208.09
Deacreasing 40,651.43 -4,867.68 0
Marginal Returns
Total -1,846.59 -4,563.74 19,208.09
Notes: The table displays the welfare measures computed in the three counterfactual scenarios described in section 5. All
numbers are in pesetas, and report comparisons of the welfare relative to the benchmark case in specification 3 from Tables
5 and 6 (i.e. the benchmark case has: non-myopic farmers, single units with right to use 3 hours of water for irrigation, and
non-paved channels). Positive numbers indicate eﬃciency gains relative to the benchmark; negative numbers indicate eﬃciency
losses relative to the benchmark. Panel A displays the eﬃciency gain/loss per unit (mean across units and farmers). Standard
deviation is reported in parenthesis. The largest and smallest values are reported in squared brackets. Panel B displays the
total eﬃciency gain/loss in each counterfactual scenario. The total eﬃciency measure is the sum (across all units and farmers)
gain/loss per unit during the 13 years sample period in our data. In both panels, for each set of welfare measures, we report the
eﬃciency gains/losses due to sunk cost, decreasing marginal returns, and the total change. The latter is defined as the sum of
the eﬃciency gains/losses due to sunk cost plus decreasing marginal returns.
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Appendix.
This is the online appendix for “Complements and Substitutes in Sequential Auctions: The
Case of Water Auctions” by Javier D. Donna and Jose-Antonio Espín-Sánchez.
A Data Description.
In this section we provide a detailed description of the auction allocating system and the
data.
To get a sense of the industry context during the period under analysis, we present a
brief description for the region’s demographics, agriculture production and weather.1 Mur-
cia’s population share in Spain was around 3% during the period. As a municipality, Mula
comprised 2% of Murcia in 1954, ranking Mula 20th in terms of population. The three main
citrus fruits produced in the area are apricot, lemon, and peach trees. Murcia’s share of
these crops was 50% (2.3 million), 44% (1.5 million), and 42% (4.3 million), respectively, in
terms of Spain’s total production of these fruits for the year 1962. Regadío land in Murcia
constitutes 4% (70,000 ha) of Spain’s.
In terms of purchasing power, one peseta from 1950 is approximately equivalent to 0.43
USD from 2013. Note that 43.06166.39 ⇥ 1.18⇥ 1.40 = 0.43 where 43.06 is the purchasing power of
one peseta from 1950 in 1999,2 166.39 is the exchange rate of pesetas per euro in January 1999
(obtained from the European Central Bank), 1.18 is the exchange rate of U.S. dollars per
euro in January 1999 (obtained from the European Central Bank), and 1.40 is the purchasing
power of one dollar from 1999 in 2013.3
Mediterranean climate rainfall occurs mainly in spring and autumn. Peak water require-
ments for the products cultivated in the region are reached in spring and summer, between
April and August. During this period more frequent irrigation is advisable because citrus
trees are more sensitive (in terms of quality of production) to water deficits.
Weather is important for our analysis as it is a determinant of seasonality. The coastal
strip of southeast Spain is the most arid region of all continental Europe due to the foehn
eﬀect, and because of its location to the west of the mountain chain Sistema Penibético,
which includes the Mulhacen (the second highest mountain in Europe). Although annual
average rainfall is 320 mm, rainfall frequency distribution is skewed, making the majority of
years dryer than this annual average. The number of days when torrential rain occurs is not
particularly high, but when such rain occurs it is substantial. As an example, on October
10th 1943, 681 mm of rain water were measured in Mula, more than twice the yearly average
for our sample.
It is important to identify cases in the four-unit auctions where the same farmer won
four or three sequential units, so as to avoid imposing further structure on the dynamic
strategic considerations of the bidders, which are outside the scope of this paper. A complete
characterization of the equilibrium when goods are strict substitutes is outside the scope
of this paper. It would require further structure on the primitives of the model as the
equilibrium depends on the believes about other player’s types, and the strategies, that each
bidder have. We analyze these dynamics eﬀects in Donna and Espin-Sanchez (2016). For
a complete characterization the equilibrium when goods are strict substitutes, K = 2, and
1These descriptive statistics are obtained from Population and Agricultural Census from the National
Statistics Institute of Spain (INE) (available online here).
2Obtained from Servicios de estudios BBVA, available online here.
3Obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, available online here.
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 1 < ⇢ < 0, see theorem 9 on p. 35 in our earlier working paper Donna and Espin-Sanchez
(2012). Following the model from Section 4 in the paper, we have selected for our estimation
auctions where a single person wins all units or where the last winner also won two out of
the first three units (for a total of three units). This represents 54% of the total number of
water units sold in our sample as displayed in Table A1. The table exhibits the frequency
distribution of units sold by number of units bought by the same farmer. Overall, 42%
(5, 880/13, 992) of the units were sold in 4CU.
Selected summary statistics for the main variables are provided in Table A2. Interestingly,
in the sample used in the structural estimation, the counter-intuitive positive correlation
between average daily winning prices and daily rainfall recovers its “correct” sign (statistically
significant at 1% level) once we condition on seasonality. The endogeneity issue arises because
both demand (due to the nature of the trees) and supply (rainfall) are high during spring,
generating an artificial positive correlation between the variables that is, ultimately, caused
by seasonality (we further discuss seasonality below).
Table A3 displays appropriate intervals for watering citrus.
We are able to observe the identity of the winner in our data. This allows us to identify
auctions where the same farmer buys all units (4CU). Complementary data from the agricul-
tural census, where we also observe the identity of the land owners, allows us to match these
characteristics to each auction’s winner. Aside from the variation in these characteristics,
which is important to justify our conditional-independence assumption across auctions, these
data allow us to confirm specialized bidding behavior from certain outliers who own a great
amount of land and, therefore, bid and win more often. This is depicted in Figure A2.
Table A1: Frequency Distribution of Units Bought by the Same Farmer
Number of Units Frequency Cumulative
1CU 3,530 0.20 3,530
2CU 2,866 0.17 6,396
3CU 1,716 0.10 8,112
4CU 5,880 0.34 13,992
No bids 3,203 0.19 17,195
Total 17,195 1.00
The table displays the frequency distribution of units in the auctions disaggregated by the units bought
sequentially by the same farmer: (i) 1CU refers to the case where the same farmer buys only one unit; (ii)
2CU refers to the case where the same farmer buys two sequential units; (iii) 3CU refers to the case where
the same farmer buys three sequential units; finally, (iv) 4CU refers to the case where the same farmer
buys all four consecutive units. There are no observations where the same farmer buys more than four
consecutive units, nor observations where the same farmer buys consecutive units across days (e.g. there
are no observations where the same farmer buys the last units of a day-auction, and the first units of the
night-auction). No bids refers to cases where auctions were run but where no one bid for the last units (see,
for example, the last four units in Figure 7 in the paper).
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Table A2: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs
Rain (mm/m2) 8.53 46.33 0 980.00 3,834
Price (pesetas) 271.61 374 .05 4,830 13,872
Land Extension (hectares) 5.54 32.24 .25 900 819
Selling Price (pesetas) 15.07 222.52 .02 5,700 964
Kg sold 5,569.70 10,003.76 0 110,000 1,000
Number of Trees 161.49 493.45 1 12,300 946
Summary Statistics of Selected Variables. SD stands for Standard Deviation, Obs stands for Total Number
of Observations.
Table A3: Irrigation Requirements for Citrus Trees
Timing after planting MonthDec. - Feb. Mar. - Apr. May - Jun. Jul. - Sep. Oct. - Nov.
0 - 1 month 2 to 3 days
2 - 3 months 3 to 5 days
4 months to 1 year 14 days 7 to 10 days 5 to 7 days 2 to 5 days 5 to 10 days
1 to 2 years 14 to 21 days 10 to 14 days 7 to 10 days 7 to 10 days 10 to 14 days
3 years or older 21 to 30 days 14 to 21 days 14 days 10 to 14 days 14 to 21 days
Obtained from Table 2 in Wright (2000), modified from Chott and Bradley (1997).
Table A4: Regions of the Likelihood and Covariates
Strict Weak Weak
Complements Substitutes Substitutes
Region a) Region b) Region c)
(equation 1) (equation 2) (equation 3)
Price (mean in pesetas) 322.97 260.34 253.31
Rain (mean in mm/m2) 5.47 5.35 3.40
Quarter
Jan-Mar 12.2 18.2 22.0
Percentage of Apr-May 42.4 29.2 34.2
observations in each Jul-Sep 31.4 29.9 19.5
Oct-Dec 14.0 22.7 24.43
Percentage of Schedule Day 55.0 57.8 41.5observations in each Night 45.0 42.2 58.5
Weekday
Mo 23.0 25.9 41.5
Percentage of Tu 22.1 19.8 14.6
observations in each We 20.9 20.7 17.1
Th 19.6 17.7 9.8
Fr 14.4 15.9 17.0
The table displays a comparison of the covariates in the three regions of the likelihood. In region a) of
the likelihood, winning prices are determined by equation 1 in the paper. In region b), winning prices are
determined by equation 2 in the paper. In region c), winning prices are determined by equation 3 in the
paper. Note that, for each region (a, b, and c) the numbers sum up to 100% by Quarter. For example, for
region a), 12.2 + 42.4 + 31.4 + 14.0 = 100. The same is true for Schedule and Weekday.
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Figure A1: Sample of Individual Data Obtained from the Agricultural Census
Notes: Sample Card from a Farmer Obtained from the Agricultural Census. Individual characteristics
include: farmers’ name (that we match to the names in the auctions), type of land and location, area,
number of trees, production and the price at which this production was sold in the census year.
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Figure A2: Winning Farmers and Winning Prices
The figure displays the distribution of Bids per Person (number of auction that the farmer won in the whole
sample) and the Mean Price (in the auctions that the farmer won). Each point correspond to a diﬀerent
bidder. In total, there are 537 diﬀerent points (farmers) who won auctions. Outliers are in red with labels.
B Proofs and Extensions.
In all the proofs below we consider the cases where the number of players is suﬃciently high
to ensure potential competition in all stages, which correspond to the empirical application.
In particular we assume that N > K + 2. We also restrict attention to the cases where c is
very small compared to ⇢k · vi.
B.1 Strict Complements.
Assumption 1 [A1]: ⇢1  ⇢4.
Assumption 2 [A2]: ⇢1 + ⇢2  ⇢3 + ⇢4.
Proposition 1. In a strict complements regime (i.e., when A1 and A2 both hold) the pure
strategy symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is:
• First auction:
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- Participation: bidder i will always participate in the first auction, i.e. y1i = 1.
- Bidding Strategy: b1i (vi) =
4P
k=1
⇢k · vi   4c.
• Second, third, and fourth auctions:
- Participation: bidder i participates in all the remaining auctions if, and only if,
she won the first auction, i.e. y2i = y3i = y4i = 1 if, and only if, x1i = 1.
- Bidding Strategy: If bidder i participates in the second, third or fourth auction
(yki = 1 for k = 2, 3, 4), she will continue bidding until the price reaches her own
valuation for the remaining goods, bli (vi) =
4P
k=l
⇢k · vi   (4  l) c.
Proof. The first step of this proof consists of proving that in any revealing equilibrium, i.e.,
an equilibrium where it becomes common knowledge after the first round who is the bidder
with the highest valuation, only the winner (the bidder with the highest type) will enter the
remaining auctions, and pay the cost c in each of them. Since both a direct mechanism and
the sequential auction will give the same utility to the winner, and both will give the four
objects to the bidder with the highest valuation, the total utility for the winner should be
Wi ⌘
4P
k=1
⇢k · vi  4c 

4P
k=1
⇢k · vj   4c
 
=
4P
k=1
⇢k · (vi   vj) in both cases, where j is the bidder
with the second highest valuation. For the case of a direct mechanism, we assume that there
is a cost of communication for each of the auctions, which should be paid by every bidder
who wants to win the object.
The second step is to show that the winner will pay
4P
k=1
⇢k ·vj 4c in the first auction. This
payment, together with the utility the winner gets from the four goods,
4P
k=1
⇢k · vi, and the
cost of entering all the auctions, 4c, will give her the same utility as in the direct mechanism:
4P
k=1
⇢k · vi  
✓
4P
k=1
⇢k · vj   4c
◆
  4c =
4P
k=1
⇢k · vi  
4P
k=1
⇢k · vj ⌘ Wi. The utility for the winner
in the second auction is ⇢2 · vi   c, because the equilibrium price in the second auction is
zero, and the utility for the loser is zero. Similarly, the utility for the winner is ⇢3 · vi   c
in the third auction and ⇢4 · vi   c in the fourth auction. Thus the total value of winning
the auction is
4P
k=1
⇢k · vi   4c. This four-unit auction is equivalent to the following single-unit
auction. Let us define zi =
4P
k=1
⇢k · vi   4c and consider a single-object auction in which the
valuation for the good for bidder i is zi. Thus, we return to the standard single-unit auction,
and bi = zi =
4P
k=1
⇢k · vi   4c is a weakly dominant strategy.
The third step is to show that given this set of strategies, there are no profitable deviations
for the other players. In particular, since the sequence of ⇢k need not be strictly increasing,
some players might find it profitable to bid for the remaining units in either the second,
third, or fourth auctions. If a loser in the first auction, player j, chooses to deviate and bid
in the second auction for the remaining units, her utility, after entering the second auction,
of winning the the three remaining units is
3P
k=1
⇢k · vj   2c, since she will win three units.
The utility for the winner in the first auction, player i, of winning the remaining three units
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is
4P
k=2
⇢k · vi   2c, since she already has one unit. There is no profitable deviation whenever
3P
k=1
⇢k · vj   2c <
4P
k=2
⇢k · vi  2c. Rearranging we get ⇢1 · vj < ⇢4 · vi, which always hold due to
A1 and the fact that player i was the winner in the first auction, i.e. vi > vj. We also need
to check that there is no profitable deviation in the third auction. In this case, the utility of
winning the remaining two units for player j is
2P
k=1
⇢k · vj   c and for player i is
4P
k=3
⇢k · vi   c.
Rearranging we get (⇢1 + ⇢2) vj < (⇢3 + ⇢4) vi, which always hold due to A2 and the fact that
player i was the winner in the first auction, i.e. vi > vj. Finally we need to check that no
loser wants to deviate in the last auction, that is ⇢1 · vj < ⇢4 · vi, which again is always true
by A1.
When A1 and A2 hold, the winner in the first auction always has a greater valuation for
the remaining units than the other players and hence she will deter them from entering.
We have proven that in any revealing equilibrium only the winner will enter the remaining
auctions. Her utilities in the second, third, and fourth auctions are ⇢2 · vi   c, ⇢3 · vi   c and
⇢4 ·vi c, respectively. Since her utility in the first auction is ⇢1 ·vi c, the revenue equivalence
theorem shows that she will bid b1i =
4P
k=1
⇢k ·vi 4c and pay p1 =
4P
k=1
⇢k ·vj 4c. Hence, this is a
revealing equilibrium. Therefore, we have shown that, given the payoﬀs in the second, third,
and fourth auctions, there is only one possible payoﬀ and one possible bid for every player in
the first auction. Hence, this is also the unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
B.2 Weak Substitutes.
Lemma 1. In a weak substitutes regime (i.e., when neither A1 nor A2 holds) the probability
that a bidder diﬀerent from the winner enters the last auction is decreasing in the participation
cost, c. Moreover, this probability goes to 1 when c goes to zero, that is
lim
c!0
(
Pr
 X
j 6=i
y4j   1 | x1i = 1
!)
= 1.
Proof. The full solution for equilibrium in this case is not provided here for simplicity. The
results are available upon request. In the equilibrium with weak substitutes, the bidding
function in the first auction is strictly increasing for low values of vi, then it is flat (pooling)
without a jump for intermediate values of vi, and then it resembles a step function with
jumps and locally flat regions. If the valuation of the highest bidder lies in the first region,
the equilibrium is similar to the case of complements. In the other regions, the valuations are
not fully revealed and more than one player will enter the remaining auctions with positive
probability. It can be shown that the support of the first region, where the bidding function
is strictly increasing, shrinks as c! 0. Hence, in the limit, the relevant case corresponds to
a bidding function that is not strictly increasing.
If the equilibrium bidding in the first auction is constant or is a step function, then the
analysis is less restrictive.4 In a pooling bidding region, bidders with valuations within the
same interval bid the same amount, and ties are broken randomly. In that case all the losers
of the tiebreaker will enter the following auction. The winner of the tiebreaker may or may
not enter the following auction.
4At the limit when c = 0, the equilibrium is not pooling, as shown by Black and De Meza (1992).
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If the equilibrium bidding strategies in the first auction are strictly increasing, then, after
the first auction, it will become common knowledge that v1 ⇠ F˜1 (v1) ⌘ F1 (v1 | v1 > v2),
where bidder 1 is the winner of the first auction and bidder 2 is the second highest bidder in
the first auction, i.e. the bidder with the highest valuation among the losers. The expected
utility of entering the last auction for bidder 2 is:5
⇢1v2 Pr [⇢1v2 > ⇢4v1]  c  p4 = ⇢1v2F˜1
✓
⇢1
⇢4
v2
◆
  c  p4. (B.1)
If no losers from the first auction enter the last auction, then p4 = 0 and in particular we
know bidder 2’s expected utility from entering is nonpositive, so ⇢1v2F˜1
⇣
⇢1
⇢4
v2
⌘
 c. Thus,
if ⇢1v2F˜1
⇣
⇢1
⇢4
v2
⌘
> c, then at least one loser must enter the last auction. Notice that the left
hand side is strictly positive since ⇢1⇢4v2 > v2 by the weak substitutes assumption. Since c
only appears on the right hand side, the probability of this event is decreasing in c. Formally,
we have:
lim
c!0
8<:Pr
0@X
j 6=i
y4j   1 | x1i = 1
1A9=;   limc!0
⇢
Pr

⇢1v2F˜1
✓
⇢1
⇢4
v2
◆
> c
  
= 1.
It is worth noticing that the result only applies when ⇢1 > ⇢4. Otherwise the term inside
the probability becomes ([0 > c]), which is impossible and thus, the limit is equal to zero,
which is the result in the strict complements regime.
Lemma 2. In a weak substitutes regime (i.e., when neither A1 nor A2 holds) it is a weakly
dominant strategy for all bidders to bid their marginal valuations in the last auction, condi-
tional on entering the auction.
Proof. In this case, there is no equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies. However, in any
PBE, the bidding strategy in the last auction will always be to bid one’s own valuation,
conditional on entering. Moreover, any strategy involving entering the last auction and
bidding something either than one’s valuation is dominated either by not entering the last
auction or by entering and bidding one’s valuation.
B.3 Equilibrium with two substitutes goods
In this section we fully characterize the equilibrium when there are two bidders, two units
and goods are substitutes (⇢1 > ⇢2). This “simple” case is already fairly complicated and
our intention here is to show how the equilibrium looks like. Solving for the equilibrium
in the general case would be more cumbersome. For simplicity of exposition, we restrict
the parameter space for the analysis here. The assumptions below are needed in order to
have only one “flat” bidding area and no “jumps” in the bidding function. The equilibrium
could still be characterize without the assumptions below, but the full characterization would
involve several cases and would be too cumbersome. Here we assume that the distribution
of types F has a bounded support and the maximum value that vi can take is W . We also
need to define the value of v as the value that solves this equation
5Note that the winner in the first auction has complete information in the remaining auctions, because all
equilibrium bidding strategies are strictly increasing and everybody observed the prices at which each loser
dropped. Hence, a necessary condition for equilibrium is that if bidder 2 wins the last auction, bidder 1 does
not enter that auction.
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Figure A3: Equilibrium bidding strategies in the first auction.
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𝜌1 + 𝜌2 𝑣 − 𝑐 
𝑊 
Notes: The figure depicts a typical equilibrium bidding strategies for the first auction. In this case, ⇢1 = 1,
thus for low values the bidding function coincides with the 45 degree line. Also, we take the case with
⇢1+ ⇢2 > 1, thus for moderate values the slope is greater than the 45 degree line. Finally, the support of the
distribution of types is bounded above by W thus the bidding function stops there.
Prob

⇢2vj < ⇢1v + c
    vj   v ⇢1v   c = 0
Here v is defined as the value of vi such that a bidder with that valuation would be
indiﬀerent to participating in the second auction given she lost the first auction. Notice
that at this point the true valuation of bidder i is common knowledge since her bidding
strategy was strictly increasing (see below). At this point bidder i knows that bidder j has
a valuation greater than v, thus bidder j will only enter when her utility from doing so is
positive (see below). Also, upon entering, since it is the last auction, each bidder will bid
their valuation for that good. Thus, the expected value of participating in the second auction
is the probability that bidder i (wth type v and valuation for the good ⇢1v) wins the auction
times his valuation minus the entry cost. Notice that, since bidder j knows the valuation
of bidder i she will only enter the auction if she expects to win. That, if bidder i wins it is
because bidder j did not entered and she gets the good for free.
With this definition, we can know describe the basic structure of a symmetric equilibrium
as shown in Figure A3. The equilibrium bidding strategy for the first auction has the following
structure, up to some threshold (c) bidders bid their valuations for the first unit. Then, from
there to another threshold (v) bidders bid higher than their valuation according to a strictly
increasing function. Finally, after v, bidders pool. Depending on the values of the parameters,
there can be multiple pooling steps, i.e. bidders pool for a while, then at a certain valuation,
the bidding function jumps discretely to a higher pooling region. To avoid the complication
of multiple pooling regions in the main analysis we make the following assumptions:
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Assumption A3:
v   2⇢2⇢1+⇢2W
Along with this assumption, in order to simplify the analysis further, we want to assume
that no bidder who wins the first auction from the “pooling” region, will want to enter the
second auction. This simplifies the analysis greatly.
Assumption A4:
{⇢2W   E [vl|vl > v]}Prob [⇢2W < ⇢1vl|vl > v] < c
Assumption A4 ensures that the winner of the first auction never enters the second auc-
tion.6
Theorem 1. Under assumptions A3 & A4, the unique symmetric equilibrium satisfies the
following properties:
(a) First Auction:
• All bidders participate in the first auction y1i = 1 for all i.
• The bidding strategy for bidder i is
b1i (vi) = b
1(vi) =
8><>:
⇢1vi if vi  c⇢2
(⇢1 + ⇢2)vi   c if c⇢2 < vi  v
(⇢1 + ⇢2)v   c if vi   v
.
(b) Second Auction:
• Case 1: No pooling in the first auction (at most one bidder has valuation above
v). Bidder i’s participation function (y2i np(vi, x1i )) is
y2i np(vi, 0) = 0
y2i (vi np, 1) =
(
0 if vi  c⇢2
1 vi >
c
⇢2
• Case 2: Pooling in the first auction (both bidders above v). Bidder i’s participation
function (y2i p(vi, x1i )) is:
y2i p(vi, 0) = 1
y2i p(vi, 1) = 0
• If bidder i participates in the second auction, his bidding strategy is:
b2(vi, x
1
i ) =
(
⇢1vi if x1i = 0
⇢2vi if x1i = 1
6When assumption A1 holds but assumption A2 does not, the winner in the first auction may enter the
second auction, even when both bidders have valuations above v¯. The proof in this case is analogous to the
one below.
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Proof. The proof will proceed by backwards induction. Without loss of generality, assume
bidder 1 is the bidder with the highest valuation, v1 > v2. Notice that when c ! 0 the
probability that we are in the pooling region goes to one. This is because c ! 0 implies
v ! 0. When the number of bidders increases this probability also increases.
2-(c): From the bidders’ perspective, once the participation decision has been made, the
final auction is a standard English auction. As a result, it is a dominant strategy of this
stage game for each bidder to bid their valuations.
2-(b)-Case-2: This is the case after pooling in the first auction, that is v1, v2   v. We will
write down the relevant expected utilities from entering and argue that any deviation (in pure
strategies) results in negative expected utility. In this case, since the winner of the auction is
determined by a random probability lottery, we will refer to the winner and loser valuations
as vw and vl, respectively. This is simply to emphasize that in this pooling region, the entry
decision only depends on the outcome of the first auction, not the relative valuations. First,
consider the loser of the first auction. The strategy states that she enters the second auction.
The only possible deviation in pure strategies is not to enter the second auction, but given
the winner’s strategy (not to enter), we get:
EU [y2i p(vl, 0) = 1|y2i p(vi, 1) = 0] =⇢1vl   c   ⇢1v   c
  Prob
✓
⇢2vw < ⇢1v
    vw > v◆ · ⇢1v   c =0 = EU [y2i p(vl, 0) = 0|y2i p(vi, 1) = 0]
Where the first inequality comes from the fact that both bidders have valuations above v, the
second inequality comes from the fact a probability is equal or smaller than 1 and the second
equality comes from the definition of v. The first and third equalities are just the computation
of the expected utility of the loser under the equilibrium strategy and the potential deviation
respectively. Hence, there is no profitable deviation for the loser.
Now consider the winner of the first auction. By following the strategy y2i p(·, ·), this
bidder will not enter the auction and get an expected utility of zero. Now, the only possible
pure strategy deviation is to enter the auction, which gives him an expected utility of:7
Prob (⇢1vl < ⇢2vw|vl > v) · {⇢2vw   E [⇢1vl|vl > v]}  c
 Prob (⇢1vl < ⇢2vw|vl > v) · [⇢2W   E [⇢1vl|vl > v]  c]  0
where the first inequality comes from W being the upper bound of the distribution, i.e.,
vw  W and the second inequality comes from A2. Thus, by entering, the winner will now
get negative utility and, therefore, she has no profitable deviation.8
2-(a)-Case-1: Now consider the participation decision when no pooling occurred in the
first auction, that is: v2  v < v1. Consider bidder 1. Her strategy is simply a threshold
strategy. As long as his valuation for the second good is larger than the cost of entry, she will
enter the second auction. Since bidder 2 will not enter, bidder 1 will win the second object
and pay a price of 0. Therefore, assuming bidder 2 follows y2i np(·, 0), bidder 1’s strategy
is optimal. We must show that given this strategy by bidder 1, the strategy of bidder 2 is
7Notice that when both bidders are pooling, they only know that the valuation of the other bidder is
above v.
8Note that this result depends only on A2. If A2 does not hold, but A1 does, then there could be an
equilibrium where the winner also enters the second auction if his valuation is high enough.
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optimal. The threshold of bidder 2, v, is the solution to:
Prob

⇢2v1 < ⇢1v + c
    v1   v ⇢1v   c = 0
That is, since bidder 2’s valuation will become public after the first auction when there is no
pooling, bidder 1 will enter whenever his valuation is such that he will have a positive utility,
that is when he will win the auction and pay the entry cost ⇢2v1   ⇢1v   c   0. We have to
show that this threshold is still binding when bidder 2 knows that bidder 1 will enter with
any valuation above c/⇢1, i.e. for any undominated strategy. In this case, the only deviation
to consider is that bidder 2 enters after losing for some valuation less than v. First, note that,
if ⇢1v2 < c, by entering, bidder 2 will get a negative utility, regardless of bidder 1’s entry
choice. There is one case left to analyze: ⇢1v2   c. According to the equilibrium strategies,
bidder 1 will always enter. Then, by deviating and entering, bidder 2 gets:
Prob (⇢2v1 < ⇢1v2|v1 > v2) · ⇢1v2   c
 Prob (⇢2v1 < ⇢1v2 + c|v1 > v2) · ⇢1v2   c  0, 8 v2 < v
where the first inequality always holds since the probability below is smaller than the proba-
bility above and the second inequality comes from the definition of v and the fact that v2  v.
Since not entering gives 0 expected utility, this deviation is not profitable.
Thus, there is no profitable deviation from the second auction participation strategy.
1-(b): We need to show that if bidders are following the bidding strategy for the first
auction as described in Theorem 1 above then they have no profitable deviations. We will
consider each part of the function separately and show that any deviation results in lower
utility for the bidders. For simplicity we assume that v1 > v2.
⇢2vi  c: Consider an upwards deviation, b˜1(vi) = ⇢1vi + ", for " > 0. This will not aﬀect bidder
1. She will win with probability 1 and still pay v2.9 Consider bidder 2. If she follows
b˜1(·), she will either still lose and get 0 or she will now win with positive probability
and get utility:
U2 = ⇢1 (v2   v1) < 0
Thus, no bidder will gain from deviating from the prescribed strategy upwards. Con-
sider a downwards deviation. If bidder 2 deviates, she will lose with probability one,
and will get utility of 0. The same is true for the case where v1 = v2: either devi-
ation still results in utility of 0. However, if bidder 1 plays b˜(v1) = ⇢1v1   ", with
positive probability, he will lose when he is the highest type, thus getting 0 utility
when previously she was getting ⇢1 (v1   v2) > 0. Thus, downward deviations are also
not profitable. Therefore, when ⇢2vi < c, the strategy in Theorem 1 has no profitable
deviations. Notice that in this case the entry cost for the second auction is so high that
no bidder will enter the second auction, thus the game becomes a second price auction
with a single good, and bidding your own valuation for that good is a weakly dominant
strategy.
c
⇢2
< vi < v: Agents bid above their valuation for the first object, because if they win, they will
also get the second object for free, after paying the entry cost to the second auction.
Thus, the “eﬀective” valuation of the first object is (⇢1+⇢2)vi c. Consider an upwards
deviation, b˜1(vi) = (⇢1 + ⇢2)vi   c + ". Bidder 1 will still win with probability one
9In the case where v1 = v2, any upward deviation will still result in a utility of 0 or negative.
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and pay the same price. By bidding b˜1(v2), bidder 2 would win the first auction with
positive probability. His utility would be:
⇢1v2   [(⇢1 + ⇢2) v1   c] + ⇢2v2   c = (⇢1 + ⇢2) (v2   v1) < 0
Thus, an upwards deviation makes no bidder better oﬀ, and some strictly worse oﬀ.
Now, consider a downwards deviation, b˜1(vi) = (⇢1 + ⇢2) vi   c   ". Bidder 2 will still
lose with probability 1. Now, bidder 1 may lose, and thus obtains utility of 0 from
deviating. Playing the prescribed strategy would give him positive utility:
v1   b(v2) + ⇢2v1   c   v1   (⇢1 + ⇢2) v2   c+ ⇢2v1   c = (⇢1 + ⇢2) · (v1   v2) > 0
Thus, no downwards deviation is profitable.
vi > v: The first step is to show that no jump in bidding occurs at v. Then, we will show that
bidders will pool for all values between v and W . The diﬀerence between this and the
previous case is that the loser of the first auction now gets positive utility from entering
the second auction. Consider the case where vi = v+ ". We now show that such agents
will bid (⇢1 + ⇢2) v  c. Assuming ties are broken with an equal probability, the utility
to agent i bidding b1(vi) is:
Ui =
1
2
{⇢1vi   [(⇢1 + ⇢2) v   c]}+ 1
2
[⇢1vi   c]
= ⇢1vi  
✓
⇢1 + ⇢2
2
◆
v
=
⇣⇢1
2
⌘
(vi   v) + 1
2
(⇢1vi   ⇢2v)
> 0 if ⇢1 > ⇢2 (B.2)
This is true for all " > 0. Now we show that deviating from this results in lower utility.
First, consider an upward deviation, b˜1(vi) = (⇢1 + ⇢2) v c+". A1 implies that bidders
prefer to stay in the “pool” than deviating upwards and getting both goods and paying
(⇢1 + ⇢2) v   c for the first unit and the entry cost c for the second. If upon deviating
upward, the loser instead enters the second auction. This will give the winner a utility
of:
Ui = ⇢1vi   [(⇢1 + ⇢2) v   c] + 0
= (vi   v) ⇢1   (⇢1 + ⇢2) v + c
"!0 ! c  (⇢1 + ⇢2) v
< 0
by assumption. Thus, bidders will not bid strictly higher at v. Moreover, A2 implies
that no bidder with type v < vi < W will enter the second auction upon winning the
first one
Now consider a downward deviation for bidder i with vi > v, b˜1(vi) = (⇢1 + ⇢2) v  c 
". Since both players have valuations above v a downward deviation means that the
equilibrium price will be lower than (⇢1 + ⇢2) v  c and thus the winner (with type vw)
will enter the second auction, believing than the other player has a valuation below v.
Then, the player who deviates will not get the first object and will have to compete for
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the second object with the other player. Playing the equilibrium strategy gives
1
2
{⇢1vi   [(⇢1 + ⇢2) v   c] + ⇢1vi   c} = ⇢1vi  
✓
⇢1 + ⇢2
2
◆
v
The alternative strategy gives:
Prob (⇢1vi > ⇢2vw|vw > v) · {⇢2vw   E [⇢2vw|vw > v]}  c
We need to show then that
⇢1vi  
 
⇢1+⇢2
2
 
v   Prob (⇢1vi > ⇢2vw|vw > v) · {⇢2vi   E [⇢2vw|vw > v]}  c
⇢1vi  
 
⇢1+⇢2
2
 
v   {⇢2vi   E [⇢2vw|vw > v]}
⇢1vi  
 
⇢1+⇢2
2
 
v   ⇢2vi   ⇢2v
2⇢1vi   ⇢1v   2⇢2vi   ⇢2v
2vi   v
which is always true. Notice that this result holds for any value of c. Under the
equilibrium strategy the entry costs does not play any role, since they are discounted
in the bidding in the first auction.
C Regime Determination
To determine the regime being played, we use the model’s prediction of the prices in each
regime. According to the model, when goods are strict complements a price of zero is paid
by the winner of the first unit, for the second, third, and fourth units. In practice (according
to the auctioneer who ran the auctions, see Botia, interview), bidders did not pay a price of
zero, but symbolic prices that are “close” to zero as can be seen in Panel B in Figure 1 in
the paper. Thus, when goods are complements the diﬀerence between the price paid for the
first and the remaining units is large (or, analogously, the ratio is large). When goods are
substitutes, the units might be bought by diﬀerent bidders and the prices of all four units
are similar as can be seen in Panel A in Figure 1 in the paper.
Thus, the diﬀerence between the price paid for the first and the remaining units is neg-
ligible (or, analogously, the ratio is low). This allows to separate the data into the four
categories described in the paper by looking at the identities of the winner (i.e. whether the
same bidder bought all the four units), and the diﬀerence (or ratio) between the price paid
for the first and the remaining units. Thus, to classify each regime, we use: (1) the identity
of the winner (i.e. whether the same bidder bought all the four units), and (2) the diﬀerence
(or ratio) between the price paid for the first and the remaining units. Specifically, we classify
a regime as complements when the ratio between the prices in the first auction relative to
the mean price in the second, third, and fourth auctions is greater than a threshold of 5.
This is just another way of identifying “symbolic” or “token” prices paid in the second, third,
and fourth auctions. We have experimented with a number of diﬀerent thresholds (e.g. 2,
3, and 4.) and specifications (e.g. using the averages of prices paid in the second, third,
and fourth auctions, the median, the maximum, the minimum, etc.), and obtained almost
identical results.
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In principle one could estimate a simultaneous equation switching regression model along
the lines of Porter (1983) and Ellison (1994). In such model, the parameters that characterize
demand would be estimated as in this section conditional on the regime classification, the
regime classification would be unknown, and the parameters governing the distribution of
the regime classification would be estimated by, e.g., an adaptation of the E-M algorithm
(Kiefer 1980). However, in our case the regime is observed, not unobserved as it is in Porter’s
case. We can determine the regime classification directly by examining the data, from the
observed prices. The first-order distinguishing feature of the regime are the predicted price
patterns by the theoretical model. Panels A and B in Figure 1 show one instance of how
these patterns look throughout the data. This is the most straightforward and, thus, our
preferred approach.
D Predicted Prices and High Definition Figures.
In this Subsection we describe how we compute the predicted prices of Figure 8 in the paper.
We also present four high definition versions of Figure 8 in the paper.
D.1 Predicted Prices.
In all cases, Figure 8 (in the paper) and Figures A4-A7 compares the average monthly prices
from the data (using the sample from the three regions of the likelihood as defined in section
4 in the paper) and average monthly prices predicted by the following three models.
Structural Model. We use the estimates from specification 3 in Tables 5 and 6 in the
paper. Then we use the model equations (equations 1, 2, and 3 along with equations 5 and 7
in the paper) and the observed covariates from the data to simulate predicted prices for each
region of the likelihood. We then compute the monthly averages of these predicted prices.
Standard English Auction Model. We use the estimates from specification 5 in Tables
5 and 6 in the paper. We then repeat the procedure done for the structural model setting
the SC and DMR equal to zero. Note that the estimate of the mean valuation of this model
is diﬀerent from the estimate of the mean valuation from the structural model (see section 5
in the paper for further details). So the  it diﬀer when simulating these models.
Reduced-Form Model. Using the same sample as for the structural and standard english
auction models, we run en OLS regression of winning prices on Past Rain, unit (3 dummy
variables), weekday (4 dummy variables), schedule (1 dummy variable), month (11 dummy
variables), year (12 dummy variables), and individual fixed eﬀects, in addition to a constant
(for details about the reduced-form specification see Table 2 discussed in Subsection 2.4 in
the paper). We then use the estimated OLS coeﬃcients to compute the predicted prices. We
then compute the monthly averages of these predicted prices.
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D.2 High Definition Figures.
Figure A4: Winning and Estimated Prices
This is a high definition version of Figure 8 in the paper. The figure displays real prices against predicted
prices using three diﬀerent models: (i) our structural model (specification 3 in Tables 5 and 6 in the paper),
(ii) a standard (button) English auction model (specification 5 in Tables 5 and 6 in the paper), and (iii) a
reduced-form model for the sample using as regressors: Past Rain, unit (3 dummy variables), weekday (4
dummy variables), schedule (1 dummy variable), month (11 dummy variables), year (12 dummy variables),
and individual fixed eﬀects, in addition to a constant. The graph shows the mean monthly averages of the
prices.
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E Estimation: Implementation Details.
Note from equation 6 in the paper that, conditional on ✓, the log-likelihood function is the
sum of three components: a part associated with the winning bids where the same bidder
wins all four units and goods are strict complements, a part where the same bidder wins all
four units and goods are substitutes, and a last part where the last winner also bought two out
of the first three units, three units in total. To recover the parameters we follow an iterative
two stage procedure. In the first stage, conditional on ✓, we recover the parameter vector
  2 R19 by MLE using the distribution of the (N   1)th order statistic.10 In the second stage,
conditional on  , we recover ✓ 2 R5 by generalized method of moments (GMM, Hansen 1982)
using the model moment equations. We then iterate these two stages until convergence.11
Implementing the estimation in two stages results in substantial computational savings (to
compute the bootstrapped standard errors) as we express analytically the solution of the
gradient of the GMM estimator.12 13
10For the exponential distribution we obtain this distribution numerically. For the Exponentiated Gamma
distribution we are able to obtain a closed-form solution of this expression (see footnote 31 in the paper).
This motivated its use originally (see Donna and Espin-Sanchez (2012)).
11For the initial condition we use a consistent estimate of   and ✓ obtained by full maximum likelihood
estimation using equation 6 in the paper (e.g. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) and Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2007)).
12For details about the moment equations, the empirical analogues, and the gradient that we use in our
program see Section E in this online appendix.
13We performed a Monte Carlo study to evaluate how well the proposed estimation procedure performs in
our setting. Using a smaller subset of parameters (7 instead of 22) we did not register substantial improvement
in eﬃciency of MLE relative to the two-stage estimator. We obtained similar point estimates. The Monte
Carlo study is available online in the earlier working paper (Donna and Espin-Sanchez 2012).
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F Moment Conditions, Gradient and Empiri-
cal Analogues
1 Moment Conditions
1.1 Moments
To recover the structural parameters, ↵ and   , we use the following mo-
ment conditions. To simplify the notation, let ✓ =
 
↵,  C0 ,  
C
1 ,  
S
0 ,  
C
1
 
,
Yt ⌘
 
pt, Rt, vN 1:N,t, {Djt}j2{a,b,c}, c
 
and x¯j = 1PT
t=1 1[Dj,t=1]
PT
t=1Dj,txt ,
j✏ {a, b, c} .
f1 (Yt, ✓) ⌘ E
 
Da,t
4X
k=1
pkt  
⇥
4  ↵  6   C0 +  C1 Da,tRt ⇤Da,tvN 1:N,t + 3c
!
= 0
f2 (Yt, ✓) ⌘ E
 
Db,tp
4
t   (1  ↵)Db,tvtN 1:N,t + c
 
= 0
f3 (Yt, ✓) ⌘ E
 
Dc,tp
4
t  
⇥
1   S0 +  S1Dc,tRt
⇤
Dc,tvN 1:N,t + c
 
= 0
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f4(Yt, ✓) ⌘E
0@"Da,t 4X
k=1
pkt   p¯a
#2
  ⇥ 4  ↵  6 C0   (Da,tvN 1:N,t   v¯N 1:N )
  6 C1
 
Da,tRtvN 1:N,t   R¯av¯N 1:N
 2!
= 0
Or, equivalently:
f1 (Yt, ✓) = E
 
Da,t
4X
k=1
pkt
!
 
"
4  ↵  6
 
 C0 +  
C
1 E
 
TX
t=1
Da,tRt
!!#
E (Da,tvN 1:N,t) + 3c = 0
f2 (Yt, ✓) = E
 
Db,tp
4
t
   (1  ↵)E (Db,tvN 1:N,t) + c = 0
f3 (Yt, ✓) = E
 
Dc,tp
4
t
   ⇥1   C0 +  C1 E (Dc,tRt)⇤E (Dc,tvN 1:N,t) + c = 0
f4 (Yt, ✓) ⌘ V
 
Da,t
4X
k=1
pkt
!
   4  ↵  6 C0  2V (Da,tvN 1:N,t)
+ 12
 
4  ↵  6 C0
 
 C1 E (Da,tRa,t)V (Da,tvN 1:N,t)  36
 
 C1
 2
Ca,t = 0
f5 (Yt, ✓) ⌘ V
 
Db,tp
4
b,t
   (1  ↵)2V (Db,tvN 1:N,t) = 0
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f6 (Yt, ✓) ⌘ V
 
Dc,tp
4
c,t
    1   S0  2V (Dc,tvN 1:N,t)
  2  1   S0   S1 E (Dc,tRc,t)V (Dc,tvN 1:N,t) +   C1  2Cc,t = 0
where V (·) denotes variance and:
Cj,t ⌘ [E (Dj,tRt)]2V (Dj,tvN 1:N,t)+[E (Dj,tvN 1:N,t)]2V (Dj,tRt)+V (Dj,tvN 1:N,t)V (Dj,tRt)
, j✏ {a, c}.
1.2 Moments Empirical Analogues
For the estimation we use the empirical analogues, fˆi(Yt, ✓) = 1T
PT
t=1 fi(Yt, ✓)
, i = 1, . . . , 6 . Specifically:
fˆ1 (Yt, ✓) =
1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Da,t
4X
k=1
pkt  
"
4  ↵  6
 
 C0 +  
C
1
1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Da,tRt
!#
1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Da,tvN 1:N,t + 3c = 0
fˆ2 (Yt, ✓) =
1PT
t=1 1 [Db,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Db,tp
4
t (1 ↵)
1PT
t=1 1 [Db,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Db,tvN 1:N,t+c = 0
fˆ3 (Yt, ✓) =
1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dc,tp
4
t  
"
1   C0 +  C1
1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dc,tRt
#
1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dc,tvN 1:N,t + c = 0
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fˆ4 (Yt, ✓) =
1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Da,t
4X
k=1
pkt  
1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Da,t
4X
k=1
pkt
#2
   4  ↵  6 C0  2 1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Da,tvN 1:N,t   1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Da,tvN 1:N,t
#2
+ 12
 
4  ↵  6 C0
 
 C1
1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Da,tRt
1PT
t=1 1
[Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Da,tvN 1:N,t   1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Da,tvN 1:N,t
#2
  36   C1  2Ca,t = 0
fˆ5 (Yt, ✓) =
1PT
t=1 1 [Db,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Db,tp
4
t  
1PT
t=1 1 [Db,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Db,tp
4
t
#2
  (1  ↵)2 1PT
t=1 1 [Db,t = 1]
TX
t=1
 
Db,tvN 1:N,t   1PT
t=1 1 [Db,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Db,tvN 1:N,t
!2
= 0
fˆ6 (Yt, ✓) =
1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Dc,tp
4
t  
1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dc,tp
4
t
#2
   1   S0  2 1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Dc,tvN 1:N,t   1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dc,tvN 1:N,t
#2
  2  1   S0   S1 1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dc,tRt
1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Dc,tvN 1:N,t   1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dc,tvN 1:N,t
#2
+
 
 C1
 2
Cc,t = 0
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where for j✏ {a, c} :
Cˆj,t ⌘
"
1PT
t=1 1 [Dj,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dj,tRt
#2
1PT
t=1 1 [Dj,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Dj,tvN 1:N,t   1PT
t=1 1 [Dj,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dj,tvN 1:N,t
#2
+
"
1PT
t=1 1 [Dj,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dj,tvN 1:N,t
#2
1PT
t=1 1 [Dj,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Dj,tRt   1PT
t=1 1 [Dj,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dj,tRt
#2
+
"
1PT
t=1 1 [Dj,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dj,tvN 1:N,t
#2
1PT
t=1 1 [Dj,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Dj,tRt   1PT
t=1 1 [Dj,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dj,tRt
#2
2 Gradient
2.1 Gradient
Let Fˆ (✓) =
h
fˆ1(✓) · · · fˆ6(✓)
ip
, Wˆ be a positive-definite weighting matrix
(computed based on our data), and m0 denotes transposition. The GMM
estimator is given by:
✓ˆ = arg min
✓✏⇥
Fˆ (✓)0Wˆ Fˆ (✓)
where ⇥ is the (compact) parameter set obtained from our model in
Section 3.
The gradient is given by:
@F (✓)
@✓0
=
2666664
@f1(✓)
@↵
@f1(✓)
@ C0
@f1(✓)
@ C1
@f1(✓)
@ S0
@f1(✓)
@ S1...
...
...
...
@f6(✓)
@↵ · · · · · · · · · @f6(✓)@ S1
3777775
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Where:
@F (✓)
@↵
=
@f1(✓)
@↵
@f2(✓)
@↵
@f3(✓)
@↵
@f4(✓)
@↵
@f5(✓)
@↵
@f6(✓)
@↵
= 2
266666666664
f1 (✓)E (Da,tvN 1:N,t)
f2 (✓)E (Db,tvN 1:N,t)
0
2f4 (✓)
⇥ 
4  ↵  6 C0
   6 C1 E (Da,tRt)⇤V (Da,tvN 1:N,t)
2f5 (✓) (1  ↵)V (Db,tvN 1:N,t)
0
377777777775
@F (✓)
@ C0
=
@f1(✓)
@ C0
@f2(✓)
@ C0
@f3(✓)
@ C0
@f4(✓)
@ C0
@f5(✓)
@ C0
@f6(✓)
@ C0
= 12
266666666664
f1 (✓)E (Da,tvN 1:N,t)
0
0
2f4 (✓)
⇥ 
4  ↵  6 C0
   6 C1 E (Da,tRt)⇤V (Da,tvN 1:N,t)
0
0
377777777775
@F (✓)
@ C1
=
@f1(✓)
@ C1
@f2(✓)
@ C1
@f3(✓)
@ C1
@f4(✓)
@ C1
@f5(✓)
@ C1
@f6(✓)
@ C1
= 12
266666666664
f1 (✓)E (Da,tRt)E (Da,tvN 1:N,t)
0
0
2f4 (✓)
⇥ 
4  ↵  6 C0
 
E (Da,tRt)V (Da,tvN 1:N,t)  6 C1 Ca,t
⇤
0
0
377777777775
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@F (✓)
@ S0
=
@f1(✓)
@ S0
@f2(✓)
@ S0
@f3(✓)
@ S0
@f4(✓)
@ S0
@f5(✓)
@ S0
@f6(✓)
@ S0
= 2
266666666664
0
0
f3 (✓)E (Dc,tvN 1:N,t)
0
0
2f (✓)
⇥ 
1   S0
 
+  S1 E (Dc,tRt)
⇤
V (Dc,tvN 1:N,t)
377777777775
@F (✓)
@ S1
=
@f1(✓)
@ S1
@f2(✓)
@ S1
@f3(✓)
@ S1
@f4(✓)
@ S1
@f5(✓)
@ S1
@f6(✓)
@ S1
= 2
266666666664
0
0
f3 (✓)E (Dc,tRt)E (Dc,tvN 1:N,t)
0
0
2f6 (✓)
⇥   1   S0  E (Dc,tRt)V (Dc,tvN 1:N,t) +  S1 Cc,t⇤
377777777775
2.2 Gradient Empirical Analogue
Finally, the empirical analogue we use in the estimation is given by:
@Fˆ (✓)
@↵
= 2
26666666666664
fˆ1 (✓)
1PT
t=1 1[Da,t=1]
PT
t=1Da,tvN 1:N,t
fˆ2 (✓)
1PT
t=1 1[Db,t=1]
PT
t=1Db,tvN 1:N,t
0
@fˆ4(✓)
@↵
2fˆ5 (✓) (1  ↵) 1PT
t=1 1[Db,t=1]
PT
t=1

Db,tvN 1:N,t   1PT
t=1 1[Db,t=1]
PT
t=1Db,tvN 1:N,t
 2
0
37777777777775
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where:
@fˆ4 (✓)
@↵
=2fˆ4 (✓)
"⇣
4  ↵  6 C0
⌘
  6 C1
1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Da,tRt
#
1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Da,tvN 1:N,t   1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Da,tvN 1:N,t
#2
@Fˆ (✓)
@ C0
= 12
266666666664
fˆ1 (✓)
1PT
t=1 1[Da,t=1]
PT
t=1Da,tvN 1:N,t
0
0
@fˆ4(✓)
@ C0
0
0
377777777775
where:
@fˆ4 (✓)
@ C0
=2fˆ4 (✓)
"⇣
4  ↵  6 C0
⌘
  6 C1
1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Da,tRt
#
1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Da,tvN 1:N,t   1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Da,tvN 1:N,t
#2
@Fˆ (✓)
@ C1
= 12
266666666664
fˆ1 (✓)
1PT
t=1 1[Da,t=1]
PT
t=1Da,tRt
1PT
t=1 1[Da,t=1]
PT
t=1Da,tvN 1:N,t
0
0
@fˆ4(✓)
@ C1
0
0
377777777775
where:
@fˆ4 (✓)
@ C1
=2fˆ4 (✓)
"⇣
4  ↵  6 C0
⌘ 1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Da,tRt
1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Da,tvN 1:N,t   1PT
t=1 1 [Da,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Da,tvN 1:N,t
#2
  6 C1 Cˆa,t
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@Fˆ (✓)
@ S0
= 2
266666666664
0
0
fˆ3 (✓)
1PT
t=1 1[Dc,t=1]
PT
t=1Dc,tvN 1:N,t
0
0
@fˆ5(✓)
@ S0
377777777775
where:
@fˆ5 (✓)
@ S0
=2fˆ6 (✓)
"⇣
1   S0
⌘
+  S1
1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dc,tRt
#
1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Dc,tvN 1:N,t   1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dc,tvN 1:N,t
#2
@Fˆ (✓)
@ S1
= 2
266666666664
0
0
fˆ3 (✓)
1PT
t=1 1[Dc,t=1]
PT
t=1Dc,tRt
1PT
t=1 1[Dc,t=1]
PT
t=1Dc,tvN 1:N,t
0
0
@fˆ6(✓)
@ S1
377777777775
where:
@fˆ6 (✓)
@ S1
=2fˆ6 (✓)
"
 
⇣
1   S0
⌘ 1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dc,tRt
1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
"
Dc,tvN 1:N,t   1PT
t=1 1 [Dc,t = 1]
TX
t=1
Dc,tvN 1:N,t
#2
+  S1 Cˆc,t
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